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IS ALL CORPORATE TAX PLANNING GOOD FOR
SHAREHOLDERS?
Forthcoming, 52 U.C. Davis L. Rev. (2018)
Omri Marian*
“The executives who run America’s corporations have a fiduciary duty
to maximize profit for their shareholders. That’s what they’re programmed
to do. One way to maximize profits is to minimize taxes, something G.E. does
better than just about any other company. If I were a G.E. shareholder, I
would be thrilled to learn that its vaunted 1,000-person tax department is
viewed within the company as a profit center.”1
Abstract: Does corporate tax planning benefit shareholders? The
prevalent assumption is that it does, because lower corporate tax burden
translates to enhanced shareholder value. In this article, I explain why this
common perception is sometimes incorrect in practice. In many cases,
successful (and legal) corporate tax planning schemes are not Paretooptimal: some shareholders may see a net benefit, while others experience a
net loss. Moreover, in certain instances it is reasonable to expect that legal
corporate tax planning will be Kaldor-Hicks inefficient. Meaning, the
financial losses incurred by some shareholders exceed the gains to others. I
identify a previously underappreciated agency problem, due to which
shareholders usually approve detrimental corporate tax plans, even when
information about the detriment is freely available. I also show that
shareholders who benefit from corporate tax plans would, in some instances,
rationally cooperate with managerial rent extraction, when such rent
extraction defuses managerial opposition to the corporate tax-saving plan.
The transactions I describe operate to shift the corporate tax burden from
some shareholders to others, while enriching managers in the process. I
discuss the legal and the normative implications of this phenomenon and
explore several potential remedies.
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Fleischer, Cathy Hwang, Jeff Schwartz, Yariv Brauner, David Hasen, Danny Sokol, Sarah
Lawsky and participants at workshops and conferences at The University of Florida College
of Law, The University of Utah College of Law, Loyola Law School (LA), The University
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of California, Irvine School of Law. Any errors or omissions are my own.
1
Joe Nocera, Who Could Blame GE?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011, at A23.
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INTRODUCTION
Under our corporate income tax system, corporate income is taxed twice,
once at the entity-level (the corporate income tax), and once again at the
shareholder-level (upon receipt of dividends or the disposition of corporate
stock at a gain).2 Tax-savings at either the corporate-level or the shareholderlevel reduce the overall tax burden, and presumably increases net value to
shareholders.3
Shareholders control their own individual tax planning and can act to
reduce their shareholder-level tax liability, with the aid of their personal tax
advisors. At the corporate-level, however, managers operate as the
shareholders’ tax-planning agents.4 The accepted view, therefore, is that
managers should engage in tax planning that reduce corporate-level tax

2

This “double taxation” system has been, and still is, the subject of an extensive
academic inquiry. See, e.g., Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate
Double Tax, 95 VA. L. REV. 517 (2009); Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-in Theory of the
Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. L. J. 889 (2006) [hereinafter Capital Lock-In]; Jennifer
Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE. L. J. 325
(1995); Alvin Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income
Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1981).
3
Arlen & Weiss, id., at 338 (“Integration, corporate rate cuts, and capital gains cuts all
confer windfalls on existing shareholders. The windfalls result from the fact that the price of
any asset reflects expected after-tax returns”); David M. Schizer, Tax and Corporate
Governance: The Influence of Tax on Managerial Agency Costs, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE Ch. 43, ¶5.2 (Jeffrey Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe
eds., 2015) (“To shareholders, lowering the tax bill is likely to enhance returns… In general,
shareholders have reason to value tax planning even more than managers, since shareholders
do not bear the same downside risks”).
4
Keith J. Crockera & Joel Slemrod, Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs, 89 J. OF
PUB. ECON. 1593, 1596 (2005) (“[I]n a large, publicly held corporation, decisions about taxes
(and accounting) are not made by the shareholders directly but, rather, by their agents,
whether that is the chief financial officer or the vice president for taxation”).
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liability, in order to enhance shareholders’ value.5 Some commentators go as
far as to suggest that corporate managers have a fiduciary duty to their
shareholders to minimize corporate tax liability,6 though this view is
questionable.7
5

See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporate Taxation and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 11 N.Y.U. J. OF L. & BUS. 1, 13 (2014) [hereinafter Corporate Social
Responsibility] (Under the nexus-of-contracts view of the corporation, which is the dominant
view among corporate scholars, “management arguably has a responsibility to maximize
shareholder profits by minimizing corporate taxes as much as possible”); Michelle Hanlon
& Joel Slemrod, What does Tax Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence from Stock Price Reactions
to News about Tax Shelter Involvement, 93 J. OF PUB. ECON. 126, 126 (2009) (“Of course, in
order to maximize the value of the firm, shareholders would like to minimize corporate tax
payments net of the private costs of doing so.”); Wolfgang Schön, Tax and Corporate
Governance: A Legal Approach, in TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 31, 46 (Wolfgang
Schön, ed., 2008) (“The basic goal which offers guidance for the actions of the management
under the ‘corporate contract’ is wealth maximization for investors. . . This makes the
minimization of the corporate tax burden an integral part of the managers’ duty of care”);
6
See, e.g., Nocera, supra note 1; Boris Johnson, We All want Apple to Pay more Tax,
TELEGRAPH
(Jan.
24,
2016,
9:06
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/12118898/We-all-want-Apple-topay-more-tax.html (“It is the fiduciary duty of [corporate] finance directors to minimise tax
exposure. They have a legal obligation to their shareholders”). Fred Imbert, Cramer: Apple’s
Tim Cook ‘Patriotic’ on Taxes, CNBC (Dec. 21, 2015, 11:08 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/21/cramer-apples-tim-cook-patriotic-on-taxes.html (citing
Jim Cramer responding to criticism on Apple Inc.’s tax planning stating that “"The main
thing you learn is that tax avoidance is everybody's … duty. You're supposed to try to
avoid").
7
There are very few cases directly addressing this issue. Courts that did address this
issue were reluctant to rule that corporate managers have an affirmative duty to minimize
corporate taxes. See, e.g., Freedman v. Adams, No. CIV.A. 4199-VCN, 2012 WL 1345638,
at 12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2012), aff’d on other grounds, 58 A.3d 414 (Del. 2013) (“The
Plaintiff does not cite any case law of this Court or the Delaware Supreme Court directly
supporting the purported fiduciary duty to minimize taxes… For reasons that are both
numerous and obvious, this Court is not convinced that it should endorse this proposed new
duty”); Seinfeld v. Slager, No. CIV.A. 6462-VCG, 2012 WL 2501105, at 3 (Del. Ch. June
29, 2012) (“[A] decision to pursue or forgo tax savings is generally a business decision for
the board of directors. Accordingly, despite the Plaintiff's contentions, Delaware law is clear
that there is no separate duty to minimize taxes, and a failure to do so is not automatically a
waste of corporate assets”). For additional analysis of the lack of managers’ duty to minimize
taxes see, e.g., Charles Gass, Outer Limits: Fiduciary Duties and the Doctrine of Waste, 92
DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 93, 97-98 (2015); Daniel Hemel, A “Duty” to Minimize Taxes?,
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL FACULTY BLOG (Dec. 22, 2015),
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2015/12/a-duty-to-minimize-taxes.html;
AviYonah, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 5, at 2 (“This Article will address the
question of whether publicly traded U.S. corporations owe a duty to their shareholders to
minimize their corporate tax burden through any legal means, or if instead, strategic
behaviors like aggressive tax-motivated transactions are inconsistent with corporate social
responsibility (‘CSR’). I believe the latter holds true, regardless of one's view of the
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In this article, I dispute the notion that legal corporate tax planning
necessarily enhances shareholders’ value. I explain how corporate-level tax
reducing strategies may increase the overall tax burden on shareholders.
Specifically, I contribute to the growing literature on taxation and corporate
governance by making the following arguments: First, I show that in many
cases, successful (and legal) corporate tax planning schemes are not Paretooptimal.8 Some shareholders may see a net increase in value, while other
experience a net loss. Second, I show that in certain instances it is reasonable
to expect that legal corporate tax planning schemes will be Kaldor-Hicks
inefficient (I sometimes refer to such transaction as “overall inefficient”
transactions).9 Meaning, the losses to some shareholders may exceed the
gains to others.10 Third, I show that because of an underappreciated agency
problem, shareholders usually approve harmful corporate-level tax schemes,
even when the information about the potential detriment is freely available.11
Specifically, I describe instances of corporate tax planning in which some
shareholders may rationally cooperate with managerial rent extraction.
The legal construct underlying these arguments is that corporate-level
taxation and shareholder-level taxation are not separate from one another.
Even though corporations are separate taxpayers from their shareholders,
many corporate-level transactions affect shareholder-level tax liabilities. I
denote corporate-level transactions that have a taxable effect on shareholderlevel taxes “STCTs” (Shareholder Taxable Corporate Transactions). STCTs
are a regular occurrence in U.S. financial markets.12 For example, a
corporation may pursue a merger under the assumption that the post-merger
corporate structure is more tax-efficient than current structure. The merger
itself, however, may be taxable to shareholders, even if shareholders do not
dispose of their stock, but simply replace their original stock for stock of the
merged corporation.13 Similarly, a foreign corporation may earn income that
corporation”).
8
A transaction is “Pareto optimal” to shareholders if at least one shareholder is better
off because of the transaction and no shareholder is worse off. See, RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §1.2 (9th ed., 2014). (“A Pareto-superior transaction (or
‘Pareto Improvement’) is one that makes at least one person better off and no one worse
off”). See discussion infra, at Part I.b.
9
A transaction is “Kaldor-Hicks efficient” if it maximizes shareholder wealth in the
aggregate. Meaning, shareholders who benefit from the transaction gain enough, so they
could theoretically compensate losing shareholders for their losses. See, Posner id. (A
transaction is Kaldor Hicks efficient if “The winners could compensate losers, whether or
not they actually do”).
10
See discussion infra, at Part I.c.
11
See discussion infra, at Part I.d.
12
See discussion infra, at Part II.
13
See discussion infra, at Part III.a.ii.
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is taxable to U.S. shareholders, even if shareholders receive no distribution
from the corporation.14 There are multiple examples of in-corporate
transactions that are taxable to shareholders.15 Thus, in order to assess
whether shareholders benefit from corporate-level tax-savings, one must also
consider potential shareholder-level tax costs. Current literature on corporate
tax and corporate governance largely misses this point.16
Significantly, shareholder experience of the interaction of corporate-level
and shareholder-level taxes varies, because shareholders have heterogeneous
tax preferences.17 Shareholder-level tax outcomes depend on each
shareholder’s individual tax circumstances.18 In STCTs, different
shareholders of the same corporation may face different amounts of taxable
income, face different tax rates, and may be able to utilize different personal
tax benefits. As a result, STCTs trigger different shareholder-level tax
consequences to each shareholder. After netting shareholder-level tax
outcomes against corporate-level tax savings, some shareholders may see a
net tax benefit from an STCT, while other may see a net tax detriment.
Nonetheless, if shareholders who benefit from an STCT have the majority
vote—they will approve the transaction even if it is not Pareto-optimal or
overall inefficient.
In U.S. equity markets, shareholders who benefit from STCTs indeed
hold the majority vote in most cases. Specifically, several recent studies find
that tax-exempt shareholders hold the majority of publicly traded equities in
U.S. markets.19 These tax-exempt shareholders always see a net benefit from
an STCT, because they share in corporate-level tax savings, but experience
14

For example, under “Subpart F” of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC §§951-965),
certain income of foreign corporations controlled by U.S. shareholders is deemed distributed
by the foreign corporations to their U.S. shareholders, even if no actual distribution took
place. See also, discussion infra, at Part III.a.i.
15
See discussion infra, at Part III.a.
16
See Discussion infra, at Part II.
17
For a discussion of shareholders’ heterogeneity in tax preferences with respect to their
equity holdings, see Doran, supra note 2, at 542-547; Omri Marian, Reconciling Tax Law
and Securities Regulations, 48 MICH. J. OF L. REFORM 1, 10-13 (2014) [hereinafter Tax and
Securities Regulation].
18
Marian, id, at 13 (“[T]he tax consequences of securities investments vary among
investors, even if all are ‘reasonable investors’, and even if one makes numerous simplifying
assumptions”).
19
See Leonard E. Burman, Kimberly A. Clausing, & Lydia Austin, Is U.S. Corporate
Income Double Taxed? 70 NAT’L TAX J. 675, 701 (2017) (estimating “that the taxable share
of U.S. corporate equity has declined dramatically in recent years, from more than 80 percent
in 1965 to about 27 percent at present”); Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The
Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S. Corporate Stock, 151 TAX NOTES 923, 923 (May 16, 2016)
(Finding that “the share of U.S. corporate stock held in taxable accounts fell more than twothirds over the last 50 years, from 83.6 percent in 1965 to 24.2 percent in 2015”).
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no shareholder-level tax cost (due to their tax-exempt status). Since taxexempt shareholders have the majority, we should expect shareholders to
vote in favor of STCTs. STCTs are indeed a common occurrence in U.S.
markets.20 Being in minority, taxable shareholders cannot prevent an STCT,
even if their shareholder-level tax cost outweighs their share in the corporatelevel savings (in terms of net present value, or NPV). Their only recourse is
litigation.21
By “tax-exempt shareholders” I mean all the special purpose entities that
qualify for tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.), such
as educational institutions’ endowments, charitable organizations, pensionfunds, governmental entities and others,22 as well as foreign investors in U.S.
equities, who are—for the most part—exempt from U.S. shareholder-level
taxation.23
Managers play a pivotal role in this context. In STCTs, managers have
competing incentives. The first incentive stems from managers’ interest in
20
See, e.g., Anton Babkin, Brent Glover & Oliver Levine, Are Corporate Inversions
Good for Shareholders? 126 J. OF FIN. ECON. 1 227 (2017) (empirically analyzing tax
inversion transaction and finding that “ for taxable shareholders with a sufficiently low basis
or high capital gains tax rate… the personal tax costs can exceed the corporate tax benefits”);
Bradley T. Borden, Rethinking the Tax Revenue Effect of REIT Taxation, 17 FLA. TAX REV.
527, 562-566 (2015) (Analyzing tax-induced REIT spinoff transactions, describing a
scenario under which overall shareholder tax liability (shareholder-level plus corporatelevel) increases, even though corporate-level tax liability decreases).
21
STCTs have indeed been subject to litigation. See, e.g., In re Medtronic, Inc. S'holder
Litig., 900 N.W.2d 401 (Minn. 2017); Gumm et al v. Molinaroli et. al., 2017 WL 1056052
(E.D.Wis.) [hereinafter: Johnson Controls Complaint].
22
I.R.C. §§501-530, 892 exempt multiple types of special purposes entities from
taxation.
23
While foreign taxpayers doing business in the United States are not per-se tax exempt,
certain rule applicable to the taxation of cross border transaction make such investors
functionally tax exempt or almost tax exempt. Generally, in the case of passive investment
income by foreign residents (meaning, where the investor does not actively participate in the
management of the investment), the United States only impose tax on foreign taxpayers’
income form source within the United States. I.R.C. §§871, 881. The source of gain from the
disposition of non-depreciable personal property—such as corporate stock—is determined
by reference to the residence of the taxpayer. I.R.C. §865. Thus when a foreign resident sells
the stock of a U.S. corporation at a gain, the income is source outside the United States, and
therefore not taxable in the United States. In addition, most developed countries would not
tax their residents’ gains from the sale of foreign equity if certain conditions are met. Thus,
in many instance, the gain from the sale of a U.S. corporation by a foreign resident is never
taxed. Dividends distributed by a U.S. corporation to a foreign resident are nominally taxed
at a flat rate of 30 percent. I.R.C. 871. However, the United States has bilateral tax treaties
with multiple countries. Under such treaties, the withholding tax on dividends is reduced
significantly. For discussion on the de-facto tax exemption of foreign investors in U.S. equity
markets, see David Schizer, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Taxing Corporations or
Shareholders (Or Both), 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1849, 1880-81 (2016).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3142145

15-Mar-18]

Law Review

7

their capacity as shareholders. Managers usually hold equity in the
corporations they manage as a form of incentive compensation.24 Managers’
personal shareholder-level tax interest may be different from the interest of
other shareholders25, such as tax-exempt shareholders. Specifically, because
managers are likely taxable individuals,26 their shareholder-level tax-interests
align with the interests of taxable shareholders. As such, managers should
rationally oppose inefficient STCTs. In addition, several provisions under the
I.R.C. impose direct tax on managers in the context of certain STCTs.27 This
adds an additional incentive for managers to oppose STCTs. However,
managers also have a second, competing interest, in their capacity as
managers. If managers’ compensation is linked to the after-tax performance
of the corporation (which is likely to be the case), managers can enhance their
compensation by minimizing corporate-level taxes.28 This incentivizes
managers to support STCTs.
Managers can solve their personal conflict of incentives. Since managers
control the transaction structure, they can require the corporation to
indemnify them for their personal shareholder-level tax cost associated with
the transaction. This is known as a “tax gross up payment”. Such gross-up
payments are common in practice.29 The tax gross up is an additional cost for
the corporation in the transaction. However, if the corporate-level tax savings
outweighs the cost of the gross-up, there is some corporate net savings left
for other (non-manager) shareholders to share in. Since tax-exempt
shareholders—who likely hold the majority vote—benefit from any
corporate tax savings, they would rationally agree to gross up managers. It is
probably always the case that there remains a net corporate benefit in spite of
24

Doran, supra note 2, at 536 (“[M]any managers occupy a dual position: they are both
managers and shareholders”).
25
Hideki Kanda & Saul, Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of Incorporation,
77 VA. L. REV. 211, 230 (1991). “([Managers’] self-interest may not be aligned with the
interests of other shareholders: the timing of the disposition of assets, and in tax returns, the
recognition of gains and losses”).
26
Only special purpose organizations that meet certain requirements qualify for the
exemption under the I.R.C. Individuals are generally taxable.
27
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4985 (imposing excise tax on managers’ value equity-based
compensation in an inversion transaction); I.R.C. § 4999 (imposing an excise tax on
managers’ “golden parachute” payments).
28
Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance and HighPowered Incentives, 79 J. OF FIN. ECON., 145, 147 (2006). (“Greater incentive compensation
helps align the incentives of agents and principals and leads managers to be more aggressive
about increasing firm value through tax avoidance”).
29
David I. Walker, Another (Critical) Look at the Inversion Excise Tax, 151 TAX NOTES
947, 951 (May 16, 2016) (“Although criticized by proxy advisory firms, agreements to make
executives whole on an after-tax basis for some tax obligations remain persistent”)
[Hereinafter Another Critical Look].
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the gross up, because corporate-level tax savings are likely in orders of
magnitude larger than the tax detriment to a few managers who hold only a
small equity interest in the corporation.30
When a corporation grosses-up managers in an STCT, the managers’
personal shareholder-level tax cost is extinguished. This functionally
converts managers into “tax-exempt” shareholders, but just for purposes of
the specific transaction at issue. The only interest that managers are left with
is their interest to enhance their compensation by increasing the after-tax
corporate income. Tax-exempt shareholders still receive a net benefit (albeit
smaller than if there was no gross-up), while taxable shareholders simply
suffer an additional economic burden (their share of the cost of the gross-up).
The gross-up payment is a simple case of managerial rent extraction, having
the corporation carry managers’ personal tax burden.
To summarize, STCTs present a previously underappreciated corporate
governance issue: tax-exempt shareholders rationally cooperate with
managerial rent extraction, and approve non Pareto-optimal, and even overall
inefficient corporate tax-planning schemes. Taxable minority shareholders
can do nothing as they see their net investment value decreases.
Economically, one can view such transactions as a transfer of value from one
group of shareholders to another group of shareholders, and to managers.
Ironically, another potential beneficiary of such inefficient corporate taxplanning transactions could be the United States Department of Treasury. If
the tax detriment to taxable shareholders outweighs the corporate-level tax
saving, it means the government collects more tax (but only from taxable
shareholders) than it loses from the corporate tax plan.31 While this may be
the case in the context of a few outlier transactions, on average (taking into
account all corporate tax-savings transactions) the government probably still
loses revenue.32
30

Id. (“[I]n cases in which gross-ups have occurred, the amounts, while eye-popping in
isolation, represent only a small fraction of deal value”).
31
Rita Nevada Gunn & Thomas Z. Lys, The Paradoxical Impact of Corporate Inversions on
US Tax Revenue 37 (August 21, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2596706 (Argue that “inversions actually increase taxes to the US
Treasury, in the form of increases in post-inversion cash dividends and, potentially, capital
gains”).
32
While some transactions may actually beneficial in terms of revenue collection, these
are outliers. In most cases, the government lose revenue, and thus lose on an average basis.
See, e.g., Babkin, Glover & Levine, supra note 20, at 228 (“the aggregate effect across all
shareholders (taxable and tax-exempt) is a 3.0% increase in value.” This suggests that the
aggregate effect is still tax reducing, which means the government losses revenue); Austan
Goolsbee & Edward Maydew, Taxes and Organizational Form: The Case of REIT Spin–offs,
55 NAT’L TAX J. 441, 443-444 (2002) (finding moderate revenue loss after taking into
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The STCT governance problem I identify adds to the growing literature
that criticize shareholder value maximization as a normative linchpin for
assessing management behavior.33 Managers cannot know what the personal
tax position of each shareholder is, and what might be the tax effect of an
STCT on each shareholder. Under such circumstances, claiming that
managers should (or should not) engage in corporate tax planning because it
benefits shareholders is a logically incoherent argument.
STCTs also have important normative implications in terms of efficiency
and fairness. The efficiency problem can be summarized as follows:
shareholder-level tax-heterogeneity, coupled with the fact that tax-exempt
shareholders control most votes in the U.S. market, encourages inefficient
corporate tax planning transactions, even when information is freely available
in the market.34
The fairness problem is more nuanced.35 Assuming Congress designed
our tax system with particular distributive policies in mind, STCTs violate
such policies through private action. Specifically, an STCT increases the tax
burden on some unwilling shareholders to a level that is in excess of the level
intended by the government. At the same time, STCT decreases the tax
burden on other shareholders to a level below the one intended by the
government.
There are several potential solutions to this problem.36 I consider marketbased solutions, tax-based solutions, and corporate-law based solutions.
Market based solutions are unlikely to be a panacea. As long as tax-exempt
investors control the majority vote, the market is unlikely to correct
managers’ distorted tax incentives. Tax-based solutions to similar problems
have failed in the past, or would simply result in different types of agency
costs. I argue that corporate-governance based solutions that would empower
taxable shareholders seem to be the most promising.37
The rest of the Article continues as follows: In Part I, I present numerical
stylized examples to explain my main descriptive argument. I show how
STCTs may be detrimental to shareholders, and how agency costs may
transpire in such transactions. I generalize the stylized examples in a formal
model in the Appendix. In Part II, I explain how the unique corporate tax
planning dynamics I identify contribute to the vast literature on the
relationship between corporate tax and corporate governance. In Part III, I
account shareholder level taxes in REIT spinoff transactions).
33
See discussion infra, at IV.a.i.
34
See discussion infra, at IV.a.ii.
35
See discussion infra, at IV.a.iii.
36
See discussion infra, at Part IV.b.
37
See discussion infra, at Part IV.b.iii
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move from theory to practice. I use the framework I develop in parts II and
III to explore two types of popular STCTs in U.S. financial markets:
“corporate inversions”, and “REIT spin-offs”. I show that such transactions
are usually not Pareto-optimal, and may sometimes be overall inefficient. In
Part IV, I consider the normative and legal implications of my descriptive
arguments and discuss several ways to address the governance issues
associated with STCTs.
I.

SUCCESSFUL CORPORATE TAX PLANNING MAY BE DETRIMENTAL
TO SHAREHOLDERS

In this part, I use several stylized examples to explain how—contrary to
common perception—corporate tax planning may result in an increased tax
burden on shareholders. The tax rates I use in the examples are similar to the
tax rates in place before the recent tax reform (also known as the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act, or TCJA).38 The reason to use such rates is to approximate the
potential tax outcomes of actual transactions (discussed in part III) that have
taken place in recent years (before the enactment of the TCJA).
The new tax rates prescribed by the TCJA do not change the analysis. The
stylized examples simply introduce the conceptual generic argument.
Applying different tax rates does not affect that. Moreover, it is likely that
the TCJA rates strengthen the conceptual argument. The reason is that the
TCJA significantly reduced the corporate-level tax rate, from thirty-five
percent, to twenty-one percent39 while making relatively minor changes to
the rates applicable to shareholder-level income. This means that corporatelevel tax savings are now less valuable compared with previous law, while
shareholder-level taxes are just as costly. This means that a STCT is more
likely to be overall burden increasing to taxable shareholders.
In Subpart A, I outline the parameters for the examples to follow, and
explain the underlying assumptions. In Subpart B, I demonstrate a simple
case of non-Pareto-optimal outcome of corporate tax planning. In Subpart C,
I show that an overall inefficient outcome is possible. In Subpart D, I discuss
the effects of tax gross-up payments to managers. In Subpart E, I adjust the
examples to account for multiple periods.
In the Appendix, I offer a generalized formal model for the issues
discussed in this SubPart.
a. Set-Up and Assumptions
Assume ExCo is a domestic corporation, with a value of $1,000. ExCo’s
38

Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) [Hereinafter:
TCJA].
39
Id., § 13001.
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profits are subject corporate level tax at a rate of 40%.40 ExCo has only one
class of stock, and three groups of shareholders:
1. Tax-exempt shareholders (TEs). TEs are not subject to tax in their
individual capacity. For example, any gain from the sale of their stock
in ExCo is not taxable. Similarly, they do not pay tax on any dividends
they receive from ExCo. TEs own 60% of ExCo’s stock.41
2. Taxable shareholders (TXs). TXs own 30% of ExCo’s stock. TXs are
subject to tax in their individual capacity. For ease of analysis, we
shall assume that all TXs have the same tax interest42 and are subject
to the same personal tax rate of 25%.43 This tax rate would apply, for
example, to dividends TXs receive from ExCo, and to TXs’ gain from
the sale of their ExCo stock. Gain from the sale of capital assets (such
as corporate stock) is generally the difference between the fair market
value of the asset at the time of disposition, and the taxpayer’s basis
in the asset.44 Assume that TXs’ aggregate basis in their stock is $60.
3. Managers (Ms). Ms manage ExCo. Ms also own 10% of ExCo’s
equity as a form of incentive pay. Like TXs, Ms are taxable
shareholders. Ms’ basis in their ExCo stock is $20.
Assume that all corporate tax savings accrue to shareholders. For
example, if ExCo is able to save $10 in tax liability, the value of the corporate
stock increases by $10, and shareholders share in the value-increase in
40

Such an assumption is reasonable under the pre-TCJA rates. The top federal corporate
tax rate in the United States was 35%. Adding state and local corporate taxes to the federal
tax rate brings the average marginal tax rate on corporate income very close to 40%. See,
Kari Jahnsen & Kyle Pomerleau, Corporate Income Tax Rates around the World, 2017, TAX
FOUNDATION FISCAL FACT NO. 559 2 (Sep., 2017) (finding that “the federal statutory rate of
35 percent plus an average of the corporate income taxes levied by individual states” is
38.91%).
41
As explained above, this is a reasonable assumption based on recent studies finding
that tax-exempt entities hold the majority in U.S. equity markets. See, supra note 19 and
accompanying text.
42
In reality, taxable shareholders vary in their tax preferences. See, Marian, Tax Law
and Securities Regulation, supra note 17. However, for purposes of the stylized model I
simply divide all shareholder into two categories of tax interests in order to present the
conceptual argument about shareholders tax heterogeneity.
43
This assumption is reasonably close to reality. Under current law, the top statutory tax
rate applied to long-term capital gains and certain qualified dividends is 20%. I.R.C. §1. In
addition, certain taxpayers with adjusted gross income above a specific threshold are subject
to tax on “net investment income” at a rate of 3.8%. This tax applies to capital gains and
dividends income. I.R.C. §1411. Thus, the total tax paid at the shareholder level on gains
from long term investments or qualified dividends is 23.8%.
44
I.R.C. §1001

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3142145

Corporate Tax Planning and Shareholders [15-Mar-18

12

proportion to their ownership interests. In reality, of course, it is not at all
clear who bears the burden of corporate taxation, and who benefits from
corporate tax savings.45 Theoretically, corporate tax can burden labor in the
form of lower wages, burden capital in the form of lower stock price, or
burden consumers in the form of higher prices on corporate products.46 For
purposes of the examples, the most conservative assumption is that
shareholders reap all the benefits of corporate tax savings.47
Also assume that any tax planning schemes by ExCo bear no planning
costs, and that they are legal. This, again, is a conservative assumption. In
reality there are always costs associated with a tax planning transaction,48 and
almost all tax planning schemes contain some level of legal uncertainty.49
Planning costs and legal uncertainty reduce the utility of a tax planning
arrangement.
Finally, assume that Ms’ compensation is linked to ExCo’s after-tax
financial results. Namely, a decrease in corporate tax liability results in an
increase in Ms’ compensation.
Benchmark: Shareholder value with no Planning. For simplicity, let us
assume that ExCo’s value is its net asset value, and there is only one year of
corporate operations (the examples can easily be extended to multiple period
as I explain below50; I use one period for simplicity). Assume that during the
year, ExCo earns additional $1,000 in taxable income, that ExCo does not
engage in any tax planning, and makes no distributions to shareholders.
Under such assumptions the expected after-tax value of ExCo at the end of
45

For a recent summary of the discussion on who bears the corporate tax burden, see
Kimberly A. Clausing, In Search of Corporate Tax Incidence, 65 TAX L. REV. (2012).
46
WILLIAM M. GENTRY, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, OTA
PAPER 101, A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX
1 (2007) (“The corporate tax could be borne by some combination of the shareholders of
corporations, investors in all capital through a decrease in the overall return to capital,
workers through a decrease in wages, and customers through increased output prices”).
47
Less conservative assumption would take into account the fact that shareholders do
not reap all the benefits from corporate savings. This would make it even more likely for
shareholders to be overall losers from corporate tax planning.
48
Ronald J. Gilson, Myron S. Scholes, & Mark A. Wolfson, Taxation and the Dynamics
of Corporate Control: The Uncertain Case for Tax-Motivated Acquisitions, in KNIGHTS,
RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 271, 272 (John C. Coffee,
Jr., Louis Lowenstein, & Susan Rose-Ackerman eds., 1988) (“For there to be a net tax gain
as a result of an acquisition, the tax gain must exceed the transaction and information costs
associated with the [acquisition]”).
49
Sarah B. Lawsky, Modeling Uncertainty in Tax Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. 241, 257-68
(2013) (developing a model to evaluate the utility of tax compliance taking into account legal
uncertainties).
50
See, infra at I.e
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the year (V1) is:
V1 = $1,000 + $1,000 x (1 – 0.4) = $1,600
Considering the ownership interests in ExCo, the equity holding values
of TEs, TXs, and Ms (expressed VTE, VTX, and VM, respectively) at the end
of the year are:
VTE = 60% x 1,600 = $960
VTX = 30% x 1,600 = $480
VMS = 10% x 1,600 = $160
These “no-planning” values will serve as benchmarks for the examples
below.
In the case of TXs and Ms, there is an additional important assumption:
That they do not intend to dispose of their stock in the foreseeable future.
Otherwise, we should reduce the value to TXs and Ms by the expected tax
cost upon disposition. Under the assumption in the examples, however, TXs
and Ms plan to dispose of the stock far enough in the future, so the NPV of
their shareholder-level tax is minimal, and therefore ignored.51 Even if this
assumption is relaxed, the argument stands. The examples below could be
replicated with a slightly reduced value to TXs and Ms (meaning, taking into
account the NPV of their expected tax liability), by using slightly different
numbers. I assume zero NPV of future taxes for the sake of simplicity.
For ease of reference, Table 1 summarizes the benchmark position of each
shareholder.
Table 1
Shareholder Group
Tax Exempt (TE)
Taxable (TX)
Managers (M)

Ownership
Percentage
60%
30%
10%

Basis

No‐Planning Value

N/A
$60
$20

$960
$480
$160

b. Example 1 – Corporate Tax Planning that is not ParetoOptimal
51
This is a reasonable assumption, for example, for shares held in taxable investment
for retirement (for example, in mutual funds). Consider TXs. Their expected gain from
disposition of their stock would be the FMV of their stock minus their basis, or $480 - $60 =
$420. At a 25% tax rate, their expected shareholder level tax liability is 0.25 x $420 = $105.
Assuming TXs plan to hold the stock for 40 years until retirement, and market discount rate
for a 40 year investment is 7%, the NPV of their currently expected tax liability is
$105/(1.07)^40 = $7.01. For purpose of the example, we shall assume the NPV of future tax
liabilities nears zero.
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Assume now that before the beginning of the year, ExCo’s management
identifies a tax planning opportunity. Under the plan, ExCo will be able to
maintain its operational results (meaning, $1,000 in income), but will only
have to report a portion of such income on its tax returns. The rest of the
income remains untaxed. For example, assume that ExCo changes its place
of incorporation for tax purposes, and becomes New ExCo, a foreign
corporation (such transaction is known as an “inversion”).52 New ExCo is
identical to ExCo, except by name and place of incorporation. Assume that
the reincorporation enables New ExCo to avoid tax on 50% of its $1,000
income. New ExCo’s end of the year value after planning (Vp) is:
Vp = $1,000 + $500·(1 – 0.4) + $500 = $1,800
ExCo’s value increases by the amount of tax saved (40% x $500 = $200).
This makes the tax plan seem like a desirable transaction to all parties
involved.
However, now assume that the transaction is an STCT (as most inversions
are). Namely, the tax-planning scheme deems the shareholders to dispose of
their ExCo stock in exchange for New ExCo stock, in a taxable transaction.
Also assume that after the transaction is announced, ExCo’s stock value
increases to reflect the expected tax savings. This “deemed sale” of ExCo’s
stock in exchange for New ExCo’s tock creates a taxable gain (with no
associated cash flow) to each shareholder.
The taxable gain is the difference between the fair market value of the
stock, and the shareholder’s basis in the stock. For example, TXs now own
stock valued at $540 (30% of $1,800). Their taxable gain is the difference
between such value and their basis of $60, meaning $540 - $60 = $480. At a
tax rate of 25%, their tax liability resulting from the transaction is 25% x $480
= $120. Taking into account the tax liability, TXs’ net position value is $540
– $120 = $420. This is less that the net value to TXs under the “no planning”
benchmark of $480.
Table 2 below compares the values to each shareholder, with and without
tax planning.

52

I discuss inversions below. Infra at Part III.b.
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Table 2
(a)
No planning
value
ExCo’s value

(b)53
Gross
planning
value

(c)
Tax liability

(d)
After tax
value
(b) – (c)

(e)
Net gain
(loss)
(d) – (a)

$1,600

$1,800

N/A

$1,800

$200

TEs

$960

$1,080

0

$1,080

$120

TXs

$480

$540

$120

$420

($60)

$160

$180

54

$140

($20)

$1,600

$1,800

$1,640

$40

Ms
Total
value

SH

$40

N/A

TEs benefit from the corporate-level savings. They enjoy an increase in
their stock value proportional to their interest in the corporate-level tax saving
(60% of total corporate tax savings of $200, or $120). Because they are tax
exempt, they have no shareholder-level liability. The fact that TE hold the
majority interest in ExCo assures that shareholders approve the proposed
transaction.
Both TXs and Ms, however, suffer a net detriment. In both cases, their
personal tax liability triggered by the transaction exceeds their benefit from
the corporate-level tax savings. Consider TXs, for example. TXs enjoy thirty
percent (their proportional holding in ExCo) of the $200 savings, for a total
of $60. However, they also suffer a shareholder-level tax liability of $120.
Effectively, they are paying $120 in shareholder-level tax, for a $60
corporate-level tax benefit. In total, they suffer a $60 of additional tax burden.
Using similar calculations, Ms suffer a $40 tax increase.
The result is not Pareto-optimal. TEs are better off, but all other
shareholders are worse off. Even though the corporation saved $200 in taxes,
the total after-tax value to shareholder only improves by $40. $160 of the
corporate-level tax savings are lost to shareholder-level tax (and show up as
government revenue). The transaction, however, is Kaldor-Hicks efficient.
Shareholder value increased by $40 (from $1,600 with no planning, to $1,640
with planning).
The bottom line is that there is a value transfer of $60 from TXs, and $20
from Ms, to TEs. The total tax-planning value to shareholders is $40. TEs,
53

For each group, the gross planning value is its proportional share of the corporate
equity after taking into account the increase attributable to the tax plan. For example, TEs’
value is sixty percent of $1,800, or $1,080.
54
Ms had a basis of $20. Their taxable gain is therefore $180 - $20 = $160. At twentyfive percent tax rate, their tax liability 0.25 x $160 = $40.
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however, receive a $120 benefit (more than the total benefit). This is only
possible because TXs and Ms pay for the $80 difference ($60 from TXs +
$20 from Ms).
Note that revenue collection also suffers. The government is not able to
recuperate all the revenue lost due to the tax plan. The government is only
able to recapture $160 in shareholder-level taxes, after suffering a loss of
$200 in corporate tax revenue.
c. Example 2 – A Kaldor-Hicks Inefficient Result
Assume the same facts as in example 1 except for the following
modification: Instead of reducing taxable income by fifty percent, the taxplanning scheme only reduces the corporate taxable income by twenty
percent. Eighty percent of the corporate income (i.e., $800) remains taxable.
ExCo’s end of year value will be:
Vp = $1,000 + $800 x (1 – 0.4) + $200 = $1,680
At 40% corporate tax rate, excluding $200 from income saves ExCo $80
in taxes. The transaction still increases ExCo’s value. However, once we
consider shareholder-level taxes, the overall tax burden increases. Table 3
summarizes these outcomes.
Table 3
(a)
No planning
value
ExCo’s value
TEs
TXs
SH

(c)
Tax liability

(d)
After tax
value
(b) – (c)

(e)
Net gain
(loss)
(d) – (a)

$1,600

$1,680

N/A

$1,680

$80

$960

$1,008

0

$1,008

$48

$504

$11156

$393

($87)

$131

($29)

$1,532

($68)

$480

Ms
Total
value

(b)55
Gross
planning
value

$160

$168

$1,600

$1,680

57

$37

N/A

As in the previous example, TEs receive a net financial benefit. Since TEs
55
For each group, the gross planning value is its proportional share of the corporate
equity after taking into account the increase attributable to the tax plan. For example, TEs’
value is sixty percent of $1,680, or $1,008.
56
TXs had a basis of $60 in their stock. Their taxable gain is therefore $504 - $60 =
$444. At a twenty-five percent tax rate, their tax liability is 0.25 x $444 = $111.
57
Ms had a basis of $20 in their stock. Their taxable gain is therefore $168 - $20 = $148.
At a twenty-five percent tax rate, their tax liability is 0.25 x $148 = $37.
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hold the majority vote, they will be able to have the transaction approved.
The striking difference compared with the previous example, however, is
that the transaction is a net-loss overall. Shareholders’ aggregate tax burden
is heavier than the corporate-level tax savings. This is a counterintuitive
outcome. At the corporate level there are tax savings of $80. However, the
combined tax cost to TXs ($111), and Ms ($37), exceeds the corporate level
tax saving. As is shown in the table, ExCo’s shareholders are $68 worse off
overall compared with the non-planning benchmark. In other words, even
though the corporate tax plan saved corporate taxes, it destroyed value to
shareholders.
One might expect managers to prevent such transactions because they are
inefficient to shareholders, and because managers themselves are worse off
(by $29). However, as the next example shows, managers will be able to
secure TEs’ cooperation to compensate managers for their personal tax cost.
In this example, the government is better off because of the corporate taxreducing scheme. While the government suffers a revenue loss of $80 in
corporate taxes, it more than compensated for it by collecting $116 in
shareholder-level taxes.
d. Example 3 – Tax Gross-Up Payments
The transactions described in examples 1 and 2 are detrimental to Ms, but
Ms are in a position to change that. Ms are in charge of drafting the
transaction documents. Theoretically, they could require ExCo to indemnify
Ms for any personal tax cost resulting from the transaction. Certain types of
such “tax gross up” payments are common in practice.58
Consider Example 2 above. In that case, the managers expect to incur a
personal tax cost of $37. They can cause ExCo to reimburse them for this
cost. The reimbursement payment, however, must be higher than $37. The
reason is that any tax payment by ExCo on behalf of Ms, is itself taxable
income to Ms.59 Thus, ExCo will have to pay Ms $37/(1- t) (where t is the
managers’ individual tax rate) in order for the gross up to account for Ms
increased tax liability. Assuming managers are taxed at twenty-five percent
rate like other shareholders, the grossed-up amount is about $49.34. When
Ms are charged with a twenty-five percent capital gains tax on such amount,
they are left with $37 at hand, just enough to cover their personal tax loss.60
58

Walker, Another Critical Look, supra note 29.
Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 279 U.S. 716, 729, (1929) (“The
discharge by a third person of an obligation to [a person taxed] is equivalent to receipt by the
person taxed”).
60
Calculated as follows: $49.34 x (1 – 0.25) = $37.
59

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3142145

18

Corporate Tax Planning and Shareholders [15-Mar-18

$49.34, however, is actually too high for a gross-up payment. The reason
is that Ms also enjoy an increase in their equity value because of the corporate
tax savings. Recall that in Example 2 the tax-planning scheme saved $80 in
taxes to the corporation. Ms, holding ten percent of the corporate stock, get a
benefit of $8 as a result (ten percent of $80). However, we cannot simply
reduce the amount of gross up payment by $8, because any increase in
corporate assets (here, as a result of reducing the gross up payments), coveys,
again, a partial benefit to Ms in their capacity as capital owners of the
corporation. Using the Goal Seek function in Excel to solve for this cascading
calculation results in a gross-up payment of about $42.96.
After the dust settles, ExCo’s value is (where Vpi denotes value that
includes management gross up):
Vpi = $1,000 + $800 x (1 – 0.4) + $200 – 42.96 ≈ $1637.04
Table 4 below summarizes the outcomes, taking into account the tax gross
up payment:
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(a)
No planning
benchmark

(b)
Gross after‐
planning
Value

$1,600

TEs
TXs
Ms
Total
value

ExCo’s value

61

SH

(d)
Net value
after
planning (b
– c)
$1,637.04

(e)
Tax Gross
Up

$1,637.04

(c)
Shareholder
tax (25% on
taxable
gain)
N/A

(f)
Tax on gross
up
(0.25 x (e))

$960
$480

$982.22
$491.11

0
$107.7861

$982.22
$383.33

$0
$0

N/A
N/A

$22.22
($96.67)

$160

$163.70

$35.9362

$127.78

$42.96

$10.7463

$0.00

$1,600

$1,637.04

N/A

$1,493

N/A

N/A

($74.44)

$0

(g)
Net difference after
planning (d ‐ a + e ‐f)

$37

TXs had a basis of $60 in their stock. Their taxable gain is therefore $491.11 - $60 = $403.11. At a twenty-five percent tax rate, their tax
liability is 0.25 x $403.11 = $107.78.
62
Ms had a basis of $20 in their stock. Their taxable gain is therefore $163.70 - $20 = $143.70. At a twenty-five percent tax rate, their tax
liability is 0.25 x $143.70 = $35.93.
63
As explained above, the gross up payment is itself taxable income to Ms. See, supra note 59. For simplicity, assume that the tax rate on the
gross up payment is also twenty-five percent. Ms’ tax liability resulting from the gross-up payment is 0.25 x $42.96 = $10.74.

Draft of 3/15/2018
Since the managers are now tax-indifferent in their capacity as
shareholders, the transaction can move forward relying on TEs’ majority
vote. In fact, Ms are probably happy to move forward with the transaction. If
their compensation is linked to ExCo’s after-tax results, they will see an
increase in compensation. TXs are in no position to prevent the transaction,
even though it is detrimental to them. TEs would rationally support the
transaction even though they are giving up a little bit of their tax benefit in
order to gross-up managers. At the same time, they force TXs to carry some
of the burden of the gross-up cost. This adds insult to injury, since for TXs
the transaction is already a loss transaction. Also, note that the total loss was
$68 in example 2, but is about $74.44 in example 3. The difference ($6.44)
is the deadweight loss resulting from the gross up payment to management.
Again, the transaction is potentially beneficial to the government. Here,
the government loses $80 in corporate tax revenue ($200 x 40%). The
government, however, collects more than that in shareholder taxes. The
government collects $107.78 from TXs, and $46.67 from Ms ($35.93 in
capital gains and $10.74 tax on the gross-up payment). In total, the
government gains about $74.47 ($107.78 + $46.67 – $80).
Conceptually, one can think of such transactions as a shift of the corporate
tax burden to taxable shareholders. Tax-exempt shareholders benefit from the
increase in corporate net value. Managers benefit because their compensation
increases. To summarize, tax-exempt investors and corporate managers have
every incentive to cooperate and approve STCTs that include gross-ups, at
the expense of taxable investors.
e. Adjusting the Examples to Account for Multiple Periods.
It is easy to adjust the examples to account for multiple periods (though
it is not necessary for purposes of understanding the generic argument).
Consider, for example, TXs in example 2.64 Their current net tax detriment is
-$87. However, in NPV terms, this detriment is overstated. Assume, for
example, that TX choose to hold on to their stock after the transaction, and
that ExCo’s earnings are always $1,000 a year. As long TXs hold on to the
stock, they enjoy their proportional share of future corporate tax savings.
Meaning, they enjoy the future benefit of thirty percent of $80 annual savings,
or $24. On the other hand, this $24 value increase also carries with it a future
tax burden of twenty-five percent on the increased stock value (the capital
gains tax). In other words, there is a future annual benefit to TX of $24 x (10.25) = $18.
If, for example, the discount rate in the market is five percent, the NPV
64

Supra, at Part I.b.
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of recuperating $18 next year is $18/1.05 = $17.14. This means that for a
shareholder planning to sell the stock next year, the true NPV of the tax
detriment in example 1 is -60 + 17.14 = -$42.86. The NPV of the tax saving
two years from now is 18/(1.05)^2 = $16.32. Thus, for a taxable shareholder
intending to hold the stock for two years, the NPV will be: -$60 + $17.14 +
$16.32 = -$26.54.
In other words, at some point taxable shareholders will recuperate their
loss.65 This does not change the argument, though, for two reasons: First, in
reality, corporate tax savings are likely significantly less dramatic than the
savings in the examples. Corporations will rationally engage in tax planning
to save a few percentage points of effective tax rates. This argument is even
stronger after the recent reform, which significantly cut corporate tax rates.
This means that corporate tax savings are likely less valuable than before the
reform. With small corporate level savings, taxable investor would have to
hold the stock for long periods to recoup their losses, if at all.66 Second, even
if one assumes that at some point taxable shareholders recuperate the loss,
this does not change the fact that an STCT takes away shareholders’ control
of their own tax outcomes (possibly against their will). Consider, for
example, a shareholder who planned to retire next year, and is suddenly hit
with a huge unplanned tax bill because of an STCT. Such shareholder will
have to change her retirement schedule to recuperate her loss (if possible) or
retire and accept less-than-planned retirement money.
II.

STCTS AND THE LINK
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

BETWEEN

CORPORATE TAX

AND

There is a large body of literature on the relationship between taxation
and corporate governance.67 In this part I survey relevant literature and
65

For taxable shareholders in Example 2 this will happen if they plan to hold the stock
for about four years after the transaction, since the NPV of the tax corporate savings will be
$63.83, result in NPV at the time of the transaction of -$60+$63.83=$3.83.
66
For example, in inversions transactions, recent modeling suggests that some taxable
investor lose on an NPV basis. See, Babkin, Glover, & Levine supra note 20, at 228 (“We
find that this upfront cost outweighs the future benefits for 19.5% of shareholders”).
67
See, e.g., Doran, supra note 2; Arlen & Weiss, supra note 3; Kanda & Levmore, supra
note 25; Steven A. Bank, Capital Lock-In, supra note 2, at 94 (suggesting that the corporate
double tax is a governmental response to managers’ practice of locking-in capital within the
corporation); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1225 (2004) (arguing that the corporate tax was
conceived “as a regulatory device to restrict managerial power”) [Hereinafter: Avi-Yonah,
Corporations, Society, and the State]; Steven A. Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs,
and the Rise of the Double Taxation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 167 (2002) (arguing that the
double corporate tax system is a historical compromise aimed at appeasing corporate
managers who objected the idea of tax on undistributed earnings).; Marjorie E. Kornhauser,
Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L. J. 53 (1990)
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explain how the identification of STCTs as a distinct category of corporate
transaction contribute to current academic discourse.
a. Agency Cost as an Explanatory Factor in the Persistence of
the Double-Tax Model
Among academics, there is a widespread agreement that the double tax
model of corporate income is flawed, and that a single tax model—integrating
corporate and shareholder taxes—is better.68 Tax literature offers multiple
models of integration, each with its own benefits and drawbacks.69 Multiple
other countries implemented some form of integration.70 Nonetheless, the
two-tier system survived in the United States for more than a century now71,
and even endured the 2017 tax reform. Attempts to reform our corporate tax
system to integrate corporate and shareholder taxes have failed.72
Scholars have offered various explanations to the persistence of our
double-tax system.73 Among others, scholars considered the possibility that
agency costs hold some explanatory power. One oft-referred article is Arlen
and Weiss’ Political Theory of Corporate Taxation.74 Arlen and Weiss argue
that shareholders and managers have different tastes for tax breaks.
Integration of corporate and individual tax, they argue, “confers a windfall
on existing assets, thereby help existing shareholders”.75 The underlying
assumption here is that when shareholders price their investments, they
account for the double-tax. If the double-tax is replaced with integration (that
is, a single tax), shareholders receive a windfall.
(arguing that the corporate income tax was originally enacted to regulate managerial power
and abuse). For summaries of this voluminous literature see, e.g., Schizer, supra note 3;
Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Tax and Corporate Governance: an Economic
Approach, in TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 13 (Wolfgang Schön, ed., 2008); John R.
Graham, Taxes and Corporate Finance: A Review, 16 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 1075 (2003).
68
Doran, supra note 2, at 528 (“Both policy makers and academics generally agree that
the double tax results in significant distortions of economic and business decisions and argue
for its repeal”); Arlen & Wise, supra note 3, at 326 (The two-tier taxation is ‘unusual, unfair
and inefficient’); Warren, supra note 2, at 798 (Concluding that the double tax system “is
defective because otherwise equivalent cases receive substantially different treatment. The
results are undesirable in terms of the potential effects on economic welfare, the complexity
of the resulting distinctions and the unfairness of treating similar transactions differently”);
69
For a survey of various models of corporate and shareholder-level tax integration see,
REUVEN AVI-YONAH, NICOLA SARTORI & OMRI MARIAN: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON
INCOME TAXATION LAW 143-46 (2011).
70
Id., at 146-48.
71
Doran, supra note 2, at 518-519.
72
Id., at 521.
73
For a survey of such literature see, Bank, Capital Lock-in, supra note 2, at 895-901.
74
Arlen & Wise, supra note 3.
75
Id., at 338.
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Unlike shareholders, managers have little “to benefit from tax cuts that
produce a windfall”.76Managers—who are “heavily dependent of the fortunes
of the firms they manage”77—“gain from [tax breaks] for new investments.”78
As such, managers lobby for tax breaks that encourage new investment (such
as accelerated depreciation), but not for integration.79 Arlen and Weiss
suggest that managers would not necessarily oppose integration, but will also
not vigorously advocate for it.80 Unlike managers, shareholders face a
collective action problem, and cannot effectively lobby for their preferred tax
break.81 The essence of the argument is that shareholders’ tax preferences
remain muted in corporate tax reform discourse. This difference between
shareholders and managerial tax interests is the “key to explaining the failure
of integration efforts”.82
Arlen and Weiss agency-cost explanation was the subject of convincing
criticism.83 Their theory suffers from several problematic assumptions, and
ignores important practical and legal realities. For example, the idea that
shareholders cannot mount a successful lobbying effort in support of their
own tax interests seems questionable. Large institutional investors (many of
which are tax exempt), dominate U.S. equity markets.84 Such investors do not
face the same collective action problems as individual taxable shareholders,
and can (and do) advance effective lobbying campaigns.85
Another failure in Arlen and Weiss’ explanation is that—contrary to their
assumption—there is a reason to expect that managers gain significantly from
tax breaks that benefit existing capital. Recall that managers themselves are
shareholders and hence would enjoy any “windfalls” of integration. In
addition, tax breaks that reduce corporate-level tax liability in respect of
76

Id., at 338.
Id., at 336.
78
Id., at 341.
79
Id., at 342.
80
Id. at 327 (“[W]hile many managers support integration, they would rather devote
corporate resources to lobbying for tax preferences such as ACRS and ITC, that encourage
new investment”).
81
Id., at 363 (“Shareholders typically are too dispersed to exert significant control over
corporate investment decisions or to lobby congress directly”).
82
Id., at 327.
83
See, e.g., Doran, supra note 2, at 523 (Responding to Arlen and Weiss, concluding
that “the persistence of the corporate double tax cannot be explained simply as a failure of
managers to act in the interest of shareholders”).
84
For 2013, The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”)
estimated that about 60% of all equities traded on U.S. markets are owned by institutional
investors. See Serdar Çelik and Mats Isaksson, Institutional Investors and Ownership
Engagement, 2013 OECD JOURNAL: FINANCIAL MARKETS TRENDS 93, 96 (2014).
85
Doran documents several instances in which institutional shareholders had discernable
effect on corporate tax reform proposals. See, Doran, supra note 2, at 581, 584.
77
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existing investment, also benefit managers. If managers’ compensation
increases with the price of the corporate shares, tax saving on returns
generated by existing corporate investments (which is likely to boost share
prices) enhances managers’ compensation.86 Thus, even under Arlen and
Weiss’ framework, managers have a reason to lobby for tax breaks that confer
windfall to existing investment. In fact, managers specifically design many
STCTs to save potential future taxes on existing investment. For example, one
of the main benefits of a corporate inversion transaction (discussed below) 87,
is to save tax on past earnings held in offshore affiliates.
It is also misguided to detach tax breaks that confer windfall to existing
investment, from new investment opportunities. Any reduction in
shareholder-level tax liabilities leaves more funds in private hands, making it
easier to finance new investment.88 For example, even if integration is just a
“windfall” to existing shareholders, it makes the cost of new equity
investment lower, which in turn makes it cheaper for managers to raise new
capital.
Most importantly for purpose of my argument herein, however, is the fact
that Arlen and Weiss fail to take into account corporate stakeholders’ tax
heterogeneity.89 Arlen and Weiss seem to assume that shareholders are
homogenous in their tax preferences, and that shareholders’ preferences are
different from the homogenous preferences of managers. Michael Doran
criticizes Arlen and Weiss precisely on this point.90 He correctly notes that
different managers have different tax interests depending on the tax status of
the firms they manage. Similarly, different shareholders have different tax
preferences, depending on their personal tax status. Heterogeneous tax
preferences leads different corporate agents to prefer different integration
models.
86
For example, existing investment may produce a steady stream of income to the
corporation from rents, interest or royalties. Reducing the tax rate on such income creates a
windfall to the corporation. If managers’ compensation is tied to corporate performance, they
share in that windfall.
87
infra at Part III.b.
88
Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Dividend Taxation and Corporate Governance, 19
J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 167 (2005). (“Cutting taxes on dividends, all else equal, should raise
share prices, lower companies’ costs of capital and raise corporate investment”).
89
Different stakeholders may prefer different models of integration. For a discussion on
shareholders’ heterogeneity in preferences for integration models see, Doran, supra note 2,
at 547-563.
90
Id., at 522-523 (“[Arlen and Weiss’] agency-cost explanation… does not adequately
account for important points, including the substantial heterogeneity of interests that
managers, shareholders, and other parties have with respect to the double tax or the
differential effects that various integration models would have on managers, shareholders,
and other parties”).
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There is no reason to assume that all shareholders would want integration
or that if they do, they would all want the same type of integration.91 Consider
the following most “generic” models of integration: “Dividend deduction”,
“dividend exemption”, and “imputation”.
In a dividend deduction model, corporations receive corporate-level
deduction for dividends paid to shareholders. The effect is to eliminate
corporate tax on distributed profits, and generate a single level of tax at the
shareholder-level. This is great for tax-exempt shareholders: corporate tax is
eliminated, and the receipt of dividends is not taxed to them due to their taxexempt status. Dividend deduction effectively eliminates all tax burden on
tax-exempt shareholders. Dividend deduction may also benefits taxable
investors, because it eliminates corporate level tax (though the dividends
themselves remain taxable).92 However, taxable shareholders may have a
different interest than tax-exempts for the timing corporate distributions. Taxexempt shareholders would always benefit form a distribution, while taxable
shareholder would only benefit if their personal tax cost is less than the
corporate level tax savings. This depend on a taxable shareholder personal
tax position at any given time.
Tax-exempt shareholders may object to a dividend exemption model of
integration. Under a dividend-exemption model, corporate income is taxed at
the corporate level, but distributions to shareholders are exempt. This makes
no tax-difference to tax-exempt shareholders who are not subject to tax on
corporate distributions. However, taxable shareholders would very much
benefit from such an exemption. Stated differently, under the current system
tax-exempt shareholders have a significant competitive edge over taxable
investors when pricing corporate stock.93 Under a dividend-exemption
model, tax-exempt investors lose such advantage, and hence have a good
reason to object to such model.
Finally, under an imputation model, corporate income is subject to tax,
but shareholders receive a credit for their proportional part in corporate-level
tax liability, and use the credit to offset their own taxes.94 Corporate tax is
91

Id, at 546 (different shareholder-level tax circumstance create “different, and
potentially inconsistent, interests among shareholders”).
92
Thus, whether the deduction is beneficial depends on the rate differential between the
investor’s personal taxes, and the corporate taxes saved.
93
Tax-exempt investors can always outbid taxable investors for the same investment.
For example, if a taxable investment generates ten percent annual return, but the tax rate is
thirty percent, a taxable investor net return will be seven percent, and he will only be willing
to offer a price reflecting such return. A tax-exempt investor can always offer a slightly
higher price, because it expects to enjoy the full ten percent return.
94
For example, assume that the corporate tax rate is 20%, and the individual tax rate is
40%. A corporation earns $100, and pays tax of $20, leaving $80 of available dividend.
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effectively an “advance” on shareholder tax. Taxable shareholders would
obviously benefit from such a system. Tax-exempt shareholder will not. Taxexempt shareholders have no use of the credit, because they have no personal
taxable income against which to apply the credit.
Tax heterogeneity also affects managers’ incentives. There is no reason
to assume that all (or most) managers have the same taste for integration, as
suggested by Arlen and Weiss. For example, Doran argues that managers of
low-taxed corporations “rationally should prefer a system of double taxation
that imposes high relative tax rates on other corporations to a system of
integration, even if the integrated system would reduce all corporate effective
tax rates in absolute terms.”95 Conversely, “managers at high-tax
corporations… should prefer a leveling of effective tax rates through
integration to the continuation of uneven effective tax rates under the status
quo.”96
Doran concludes that it is wrong to attribute the survival corporate tax
system “to the divergence of interests between managers (understood as a
single group) and shareholders (understood as a single group)”.97 Instead, he
attributes it “to the divergence of interests among managers, the divergence
of interests among shareholders, and the divergence of interests among other
parties affected by the double tax.”98 The bottom line is that different
integration proposal will have different winners and losers, and to-date,
Congress was unable to design an acceptable political compromise.
The STCT frameworks adds another level to Doran’s criticism. Doran
shows that by ignoring corporate stakeholder’s heterogeneity of tax
preferences, Arlen and Wise misrepresent the rational interests of various
agents in tax reform discourse. My addition is to show that tax heterogeneity
also affects the interests of stakeholders in respect of on-going corporate
operations. Under Arlen and Weiss’ framework, shareholders benefit from
tax savings regardless if the saving is at the corporate or the shareholder level.
What matters in their framework, is that there be a single, rather than double,
tax. STCTs prove this assumption incorrect. Once we consider STCTs, it
Nonetheless, the shareholder dividend is grossed-up for the corporate tax paid, and the
shareholder is treated as receiving $100 in taxable dividend. The shareholder’s tax liability
is therefore $40 (forty percent of $100), but the shareholder also receives a credit for the
corporate tax paid ($20). Thus, the shareholder only has to remit the remaining $20 to the
tax authority. The total tax paid is forty percent, which represents a single level of tax paid
at the shareholder’s personal rates: $20 are paid by the corporation, and $20 by the
shareholder.
95
Doran, supra note 2, at 541.
96
Id., at 541-542.
97
Id., at 523.
98
Id.
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becomes clear that it is sometimes rational for shareholders to object
corporate-level tax reduction. Stated differently, a single tax model does not
necessarily produce a lower overall tax burden for all shareholders. In
STCTs, the elimination of corporate level tax, is sometimes translated to a
higher (single-level) shareholders tax.
b. Corporate Taxation as a Governance Instrument
i. Corporate tax and shareholders’ heterogeneous tax
preferences
Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore’s seminal paper99 suggests that the
separate taxation of corporate entities mitigates agency costs. They start with
the presumption that managers’ and shareholders have diverse tax
interests.100 Kanda and Levmore recognize that shareholders themselves have
diverging tax interests and are “therefore in occasional conflict with one
another.”101 This is a source of a conflict of interest between managers who
hold equity in the corporations they run, and other shareholders. In their
capacity as equity holders, managers may prefer their own shareholder-level
tax-interests to the tax-interests of other shareholders. Kanda and Levmore
suggest that the double-tax model mitigates this problem, because it
“’equalizes’ shareholders' preferences for corporate transactions even though
shareholders are in diverse individual tax circumstances.”102
In order to explain how such “equalization” works, Kanda & Levmore
imagine an alternative system of “pass-through” taxation, “in which
corporations are not separately taxed”103 but instead, “shareholders are taxed
each year, at their respective individual rates, on their imputed shares of the
firm's income.”104 This is, in fact, how taxation of partners in partnerships
generally works under current law.105 Such pass-through model is another
potential model of integration.106 In such a case, agency costs arise since the
manager “will want to make corporate decisions that benefit managers’ own
tax situation.”107 For example, the manager’s “self-interest is likely to involve
retaining appreciated assets (inside the corporation) in order to postpone
99

Supra note 25.
Id., at 229. (Our argument focuses on the fact that [managers'] individual tax rate will
often be different from that of other shareholders, or principals.
101
Id.
102
Id., at 213.
103
Id., at 229
104
Id., at 229.
105
I.R.C. §701
106
Under a “pass-though” model, all entity-level tax attributes simply flow through to
the equity owners, who pay tax on their share in the entity profits.
107
Kanda, and Levmore, Supra note 25, at 230.
100
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recognizing gain, when lower-taxed shareholders would prefer that the
corporation sell these assets and perhaps invest in other assets.”108
When the corporate entity and its shareholders are taxed separately,
however, the tax interest of the shareholders and managers are aligned. This
is so because “in-corporate” tax consequences presumably do not affect
shareholder-level taxation. “By … taxing a corporation as a distinct entity,
tax law causes all shareholders to agree (at least in tax terms) on timing
questions. It is in [the manager’s] interest and in the interest of all the other
shareholders for the corporation to be as profitable as possible regardless of
their individual tax rates.”109 Under such a framework, everyone benefits
from successful corporate-level tax planning (because the overall tax burden
is reduced), regardless of each shareholder personal tax stance.
However, Kanda & Levmore’s argument is only true if one assumes that
entity-level taxation is in fact separate from shareholder taxation. This
assumption does not always stand. In STCTs, “in-corporate” tax planning
schemes directly affect shareholder-level tax liability. An STCT reintroduces
the same agency problems Kanda and Levmore identify in the context of the
pass-through model. Managers may prefer their own tax interests to the tax
interest of other shareholders. The tax gross-up payment is one such example.
This significantly narrows the breadth of Kanda and Levmore’s argument to
non-STCT transactions.
ii. Corporate tax as a monitoring instrument
Some researchers suggest that the double-tax model enhances
shareholders’ ability to monitor managers. Consider, for example, pyramidal
ownership structures. Such structures are detrimental to corporate
governance, because they are opaque and enable insiders to unbundle control
from financial risk. 110 The double-tax model is a strong incentive against
pyramidal ownership structures, because each inter-company payment along
the corporate chain potentially creates an additional layer of tax burden.
While many countries provide a relief from intercompany dividend taxation,
such dividends remain at least partially taxable in the United States.111 This
108

Id.
Id.
110
Morck & Yueng, supra note 88, at 177. (“Numerous studies… attest to the
importance of governance problems in pyramids, especially in countries that provide public
shareholders with weak legal rights against corporate insiders”).
111
IRC §243 allows a corporate recipient of a dividend to deduct seventy percent of the
dividend received from another corporation (“dividend received deduction” or “DRD”).
Functionally, this means that only thirty percent of the dividend is taxable to the recipient.
The DRD amount is increased to eighty percent if the recipient holds at least twenty percent
of the vote and value in the distribution corporation, and to a hundred percent (meaning,
109
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fact likely plays a significant role in preventing pyramidal ownership
structures in the United States, while such structures remain common
elsewhere.112
Pyramids, however, make it less likely that a corporate-level tax plan will
be taxable to the ultimate shareholders. The reason is that pyramids distance
the tax-outcomes of public shareholders at the top of the chain, from the tax
consequences of the corporation at the bottom of the chain. It is easy to
envision a corporate transaction that is also taxable to the corporate
shareholder one level up the chain (because, for example, it creates a deemed
sale by the shareholder). It is harder to imagine corporate transactions that
affects the tax liabilities of shareholders all the way to the top of the chain of
the pyramid (though it is possible). For a transaction to be an STCT in a
pyramid – there must be a taxable event at each level of the pyramid all the
way to the top. While the double-tax model discourages pyramidal
ownership, it makes STCTs (and their associate agency problems) more
likely. This is so because in the absence of pyramidal structures, STCTs are
less costly to engage in.
Ironically, one of the main agency problems of pyramids is the ability of
“majority shareholders—often in collusion with directors—[to] divert
company’s assets to themselves, departing from arm’s-length conditions in
their contractual relationship with the company.”113 STCT enable exactly
that: the ability of managers and tax-exempt shareholders to divert
companies’ profits to themselves, against the interest of minority (taxable)
shareholders.
Another line of literature identifies corporate taxation as a potential
instrument for monitoring managers. Marjory Kornhuaser, for example,
argues that the introduction of separate taxation of corporate entities in 1909
was a response to the corporate consolidation phenomenon at the turn of the
twentieth century, and the ensuing increase in corporate influence.114 A key
aspect of corporate tax as introduced at the time was that corporate tax
information was public.115 The idea was to provide investors with
complete elimination of tax on the intercompany dividend), if the recipient holds at least
eighty percent of the vote and value in the distributing corporation.
112
Morck & Yueng, supra note 88, at 177 (“With its tax on intercorporate dividends,
the United States has a highly exceptional corporate sector, almost devoid of pyramids…
America’s intercorporate dividend taxation rules is probably a key, though largely
unappreciated, reason for this exceptionalism”).
113
Schön, supra note 5, at 60.
114
Kornhauser, supra note 68, at 55-82 (describing the era of corporate consolidation,
political responses and early attempts at corporate regulation). See, also, id, at 133 (“Concern
about corporations focused on the large corporations and their monopoly of the market”).
115
For a discussion of the various publicity features, see Id., at 113-133.
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information that would assist them to supervise management.116 Similarly,
Reuven Avi-Yonah suggest that that the corporate tax as originally enacted
was “primarily viewed as a regulatory device to restrict managerial
power.”117 The regulatory feature “was achieved most directly through the
publicity feature of the tax”118 but also because tax had “the potential to
regulate management directly by reducing corporate wealth and therefore
restricting managerial power.”119
This historical rational seems to be outdated, given that corporate tax
information is no longer public.120 There is a healthy debate about whether
corporate tax information should be public, and it is beyond the scope of this
article to consider it.121 It is clear, however, that corporate tax privacy makes
it harder for minority shareholders to monitor managers’ corporate tax
decisions.122 STCTs exacerbate such negative effects: opaque corporate tax
planning not only hinders shareholders ability to monitor managers, but may
also result in a direct shareholder-level tax detriment.
More importantly, STCTs demonstrate that in some instances, the
availability of tax information has little effect on the ability of shareholders
to regulate managers. The information about the tax detriment to taxable
shareholders STCTs is freely available. Information about tax gross-up
payments to managers is also disclosed. But there is little that taxable
shareholders can do long as they are in minority. Tax exempt shareholders
have every incentive to cooperate with managerial rent extraction, because
they also benefit from STCTs.
c. Double Taxation and Corporate Distribution Policies
The double-tax model affects corporate financing structure and
distribution policies in ways that exacerbate agency costs.123 It does so in two
ways: First, it incentivizes managers to retain earnings. Second, it creates a
116
Id. 131 (“The regulations, therefore, required publicity of the returns of these
corporations in order to provide potential investors the information needed to make informed
decisions. In this respect the regulations became the forerunner of Securities and Exchange
Commission reporting”).
117
Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State, supra note 67, at 1225.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
I.R.C. §§ 6103 prescribes strong confidentiality protections on tax returns and return
information.
121
For an excellent recent discussion on corporate tax privacy, see, Joshua D. Blank,
Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy, 11 NYU J. OF L. & BUS. 31 (2014).
122
See, e.g., David. Kamin (moderator), Panel 2: Should Corporate Tax Returns be
Public?, 11 NYU J. OF L. & BUS. 159 (2014).
123
See, Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 67, at 27-29 (discussing the interaction
between corporate financing choices, distribution policies, and corporate governance).
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conflict among shareholders with regard to distribution policies.
Consider the earning retention problem first. “Dividends mitigate agency
costs by reducing the resources under management’s control.”124 Selfinterested managers may therefore prefer not to declare dividends, even if it
is in the best interest of shareholders. Since dividends are taxable to
shareholders, “managers could invoke [shareholder] tax as a pretext not to
pay dividends”125 under the theory that shareholders would benefit from
deferred tax liability. Thus, the double tax model may support managers
retention of corporate earnings beyond an optimal level.126 There is empirical
evidence suggesting that this happens in practice. 127
Next, consider shareholder preferences for corporate distributions. Since
different shareholders are in different tax positions, they may have diverging
interests in such context.128 Tax-exempt shareholders would like distributions
because they are not taxable to them yet generate liquidity. Taxable
shareholders may or may not like distributions, depending on their particular
tax situation.
Kanda and Levmore recognize the agency problems associated with
corporate distributions, but argue they are “less important” than the agency
124

Schizer, supra note 367, at ¶4.1.3.; Arlen and Weiss, supra note 3, at 352-356
(discussing how the double-tax model may encourage some managers to retain earnings).
Other commentators, however, suggest that management in U.S. corporations retained
earnings even before the introduction of the corporate tax. See, Bank, Capital Lock-in, supra
note 2, at 918 (the rise of retained corporate earnings “occurred prior to the ratification of
the Sixteenth Amendment and thus during a period in which the income tax could not have
been a factor”). Instead, Bank suggests that the double tax model should be viewed as a
response to the retained earnings problem, and not the other way around. Specifically, Bank
argues that the double tax model is a political compromise between supporters of the passthrough system (which would have taxed shareholders on a current basis), and supporters of
taxation of retained corporate earnings (which corporate managers objected). See, Bank, id.,
946-947.
125
Schizer, id.
126
In practice, management incentives in such context are more nuanced. First, taxexempt shareholders have no potential upside from deferral, since they are not subject to tax
on dividend. In respect of tax-exempt shareholders, manager cannot use dividend taxation as
a pretextual excuse not to distribute dividends. Second, it is not clear that taxable shareholder
always benefit from dividend deferral, because retained earnings presumably accumulate
income themselves, thus increasing the tax-base to shareholders upon future distribution. If
the after tax return on profits grows at the same rate both inside the firm and at the hand of
shareholders, than deferral makes not difference in net-present-value terms. For a discussion,
see Schizer, id.
127
For a summary of empirical evidence of the effect of the double-tax model on
corporate distribution policies, see, Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 28, at 27-29.
128
See, Kanda & Levmore, supra note 25, at 234-238 (discussing conflicts of interest in
the context of corporate distribution policies).
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problems associated with “in-corporate” decisions129 (such as whether to
engaged in a particular transaction). Recall, that under Kanda & Levmore
counter-factual scenario—where corporate transactions affect shareholder
tax liability—managers have an incentive to structure “in-corporate”
transaction to benefit the managers’ own tax-interests. This may result in
inefficient transactions, for example, if a manager refrains from selling an
asset because of manager’s self-tax-interest.130 The problem is less acute in
the distribution context, they argue, because investors who are disappointed
with corporate distribution policies can simply “sell… their shares.”131 In
other words, investors have control on when to dispose of their stock, which
allows them to alleviate any shareholder-level tax detriment resulting from
corporate distribution policies.
What Kanda & Levmore are referencing here is the “Clientele Theory”,132
under which investors’ tax preferences affect their portfolio composition. For
example, the clientele theory predicts that taxable investors will gravitate
towards investments in growth companies, which rarely distribute dividends.
This way, taxable investors retain control on the timing of gain recognition
(since they will only recognize shareholder-level taxes upon disposition of
their stock). Tax-exempt investors, on the other hand, would prefer
investment in firms that regularly distribute dividends. The reason is that taxexempt investors enjoy the liquidity, but do not suffer any shareholder-level
tax detriment that may be associate with the distribution.
In the presence of STCTs, however, Kanda & Levmore argument loses
its strength. Clientele effects are only a good remedy to shareholder-level tax
detriment if shareholders can control of the timing of shareholder-level gain
recognition. This is not the case in STCTs. In an STCT, managerial decision
about “in-corporate” transactions, dictates the timing of shareholder-level
gain recognition.133
Investors may be able react to ongoing known corporate distribution
policies, and choose to invest in companies with distribution policies that
match the investors’ tax preferences. Unlike distribution policy, however,
129

Id., at 236. (“[T]here is a reason to think that the agency costs associated with
dispositions, or with in-corporate decisions in-general, are greater and socially more
important than those associated with distribution policies”).
130
Id. (“Assets that would otherwise move to higher valued uses will not be so moved
because of [the manager’s] self-interested behavior”).
131
Id.
132
See, MYRON S. SCHOLES ET. AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 142-145 (4th ed.,
2009) (discussing clientele effects).
133
Of course, taxable shareholder may try to sell their stock before the transaction closes,
but capital market hypothesis assumes that any costs to the shareholder will be reflected in
the stock price as soon as the transaction is announced.
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there is no (and cannot be) “STCT policy”. STCTs are “one-off” transactions
that are not part of a standard corporate policy that shareholder can anticipate
and react to ahead of time. There is no efficient way for taxable investors to
anticipate STCTs before they are announced and calibrate their portfolio
accordingly.
There is an additional reason for which Kanda & Levmore believe that
“in-corporate” inefficiency is worse than inefficiency resulting from
distribution policies.134 If earnings are simply retained, there is no “real
inefficiency” because “it is actual investment decisions rather than financing
decisions that matter.”135 In this, Kanda & Levmore assume that in-corporate
efficiency outweighs the shareholder-level inefficiency. As I demonstrated in
Part I above, that is not necessarily the case in STCTs. It is plausible to expect
that in some transactions the “in-corporate” tax benefit is outweighed by
“shareholder-level” tax detriment.
d. Corporate-level Tax Planning and Collateral Governance
Effects
While shareholders may benefit from reduced corporate tax liability,
corporate tax planning may create corporate governance costs. “The basic
intuition … is that tax avoidance demands complexity and obfuscation to
prevent detection. These characteristics, in turn, can become a shield for
managerial opportunism.”136
The best-known example for such dynamics is probably the demise of the
Enron Corporation. A Congressional report by the Joint Committee on
Taxation (JCT) notes: “as Enron’s management realized that tax motivated
transactions could generate financial accounting benefits, Enron looked to its
tax department to devise transactions that increased financial accounting
income”.137 In designing its tax-motivated transactions, Enron “excelled at
making complexity an ally. Many transactions used exceedingly complicated
structures and were designed to provide tax benefits significantly into the
future. For any person attempting to review the transaction, there would be
134

Kanda & Levmore, supra note 25, at 236.
Id.
136
Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 28, at 14. See, also, Schön, supra note 5, at 55
(“Shareholders face a trade-off between the tax advantages which can be derived from
complicated corporate group and financing structures on the one hand and the lack of
management control resulting from these structures on the other hand”); Schizer, supra note
3, at ¶4.3.5. (“Self-interested tax structuring is especially hard for shareholders to monitor,
since tax rules are so esoteric”).
137
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON
CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION
ISSUES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 21 (2003) [Hereinafter: JCT ENRON REPORT].
135
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no easy way to understand its terms or purpose.”138 For example, at the end
of 2001, Enron had about 1,300 foreign subsidiaries and other foreign
affiliated entities.139 About eighty percent of Enron’s foreign affiliates “were
inactive shells that did not hold and were not engaged in or associated with
any ongoing business.”140 Under such circumstances, effective shareholder
monitoring is exceedingly difficult. The JCT report identified multiple
corporate governance deficiencies that were the result of Enron’s aggressive
tax stances.141
Scholars explored various types of corporate tax planning transactions
and their potential negative governance effects.142 One oft-cited transaction
type is the “corporation inversion”, in which a domestic corporation becomes
foreign in order to escape U.S. taxes. Even if such transaction saves taxes,
moving corporate residence to a foreign jurisdiction comes at a cost.143 Target
jurisdictions may offer inferior shareholder protections compared with the
ones offered by U.S. corporate and securities law.144
138

Id., at 23.
Id., at 11.
140
Id.
141
For example, issues relating to compensation and retirement planning. Id., at 19
(“Some of the issues examined by the Joint Committee staff with respect to Enron’s
retirement plans and compensation arrangements raise nontax issues, such as issues of
corporate governance and fiduciary responsibility); Issues relating to Employee loans. Id., at
41 (“The loans raise Federal tax issues as well as corporate governance issues”); Issues
relating to commodities transactions. Id., at 359 (“Enron’s reliance upon credit-linked notes
in … transactions to effectively create credit capacity for additional commodity prepay
transactions raises questions that are pertinent primarily to corporate governance and
financial accounting”).
142
See, e.g., Mihir Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance and
High-Powered Incentives, 79 J. OF FIN. ECON. 145, 176 (2006). (“[W]hile unexploited
opportunities for tax sheltering with little or no risk of penalties could exist, increasing tax
avoidance would create greater opportunities for managerial diversion. If managers cannot
credibly commit to overlooking those opportunities, then shareholders could prefer that
managers not engage in tax sheltering activity”);
143
Cathy Hwang, The New Corporate Migration: Tax Diversion through Inversion, 80
BROOK. L. REV. 807, 837-51 (2015) (Discussing various collateral costs of inversion
transactions).
144
Schizer, supra note 3, at ¶5.1.1.(“Other jurisdictions may not offer comparable
shareholder protections, especially tax havens like the Cayman Islands or Bermuda”); See,
also, Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition,
101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1652 (2015) (“Tax inversions can introduce material downstream
legal risk, since they move the locus of corporate internal affairs out of conventional
jurisprudential terrain and into the domain of a foreign jurisdiction whose law is—by
comparison—recondite and unfamiliar”); Gregory R. Day, Irrational Investors and the
Corporate Inversions Puzzle, 69 SMU L. REV. 453, 457 (2016) (“From a director’s
standpoint, inversions are quite appealing for reasons beyond reducing corporate taxes.
Principally, a company’s leadership may structure an inversion to diminish management’s
139

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3142145

15-Mar-18]

Law Review

35

The unique dynamics of STCTs worsens the governance problems
associated with corporate tax planning, by burdening taxable shareholders
(and the corporation – in case of gross-ups) with direct tax cost. Cost-benefits
analyses of tax-planning transactions seems to consider corporate tax savings
against transaction costs and potential governance costs. In an STCT, direct
shareholders’ tax liability is an additional significant cost to account for.
III.

STCTS IN PRACTICE: INVERSIONS AND REIT SPINOFFS

So far, I have identified STCTs as a distinct type of corporate transaction
and explained the unique governance problems it presents. The purpose of
this part is to shift the discussion from theory to practice. Again, given recent
tax reform, the transaction described herein were designed and executed
under the pre-reform law. There is no telling what types of corporate tax
planning will take shape under the new law, but the generic point still stands:
corporate tax planning may be detrimental to shareholders.
Subpart A provides a brief legal background, explaining how—under the
I.R.C.—corporate transactions may be taxable to shareholders. In subparts B
and C, I explore two types of popular STCTs: corporate inversions and REIT
spin-offs, and analyze both under the framework developed in the previous
parts of the article.
a. Shareholder-Taxable Corporate Transactions in General
Generally, the I.R.C. prescribes that corporations and their shareholders
are taxed separately. As taxpayers, corporations pay corporate income tax.145
Shareholders are individually liable to tax on taxable corporate distributions,
such as dividends.146 In addition, dispositions of corporate stock may trigger
capital gains or losses.147
The I.R.C., however, contains multiple instances in which corporate-level
transaction may have a direct effect on shareholder-level tax liabilities. It is
beyond the scope of this article to explore all such possible scenarios, but
most fall into one of three categories: deemed distributions, deemed
dispositions, and forced distributions.
i. Deemed Distributions

duty to comply with a number of burdensome corporate regulations”); Mitchell A. Kane &
Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter Competition, 106 Mich. L.
Rev. 1229 (2008) (exploring how various corporate tax-residence rule distort corporate
charter competition).
145
I.R.C. § 11.
146
I.R.C. § 61.
147
Id.
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The I.R.C. sometimes prescribes that income earned by a corporation is
deemed distributed to shareholders, even if no actual distribution took place.
In such a case, shareholders must pay tax on such deemed distribution.148
Deemed distributions apply in the context of several “anti-deferral” regimes.
The purpose of such regimes is to prevent U.S. shareholders from deferring
taxation by channeling income into controlled corporations.149
For example, under Subpart F of the I.R.C.150, “Subpart F income” earned
by “Controlled Foreign Corporations” (CFCs) is deemed distributed to “U.S.
Shareholders” even if no distribution occurred.151 Generally, Subpart F
income is income derived from passive activities.152
Subpart F is the Congressional response to U.S. multinational
corporations channeling income through foreign subsidiaries in low-tax
jurisdictions.153 For example, in the absence of Subpart F, a U.S.
multinational could reduce its U.S. tax liability by making a deductible
payment (such as interest on inter-company debt) to a controlled foreign
affiliate organized in a tax haven. In order to prevent such perceived abuse,
the I.R.C. deems any “Subpart F income” earned by a CFC as immediately
distributed to U.S. Shareholders.
Before the recent tax reform, CFC’s income that was not Subpart F
income was not taxable in the United States until repatriated to U.S.
shareholders, usually in the form of a dividend. It would have been possible
148
This creates what is sometimes referred to as “phantom income”. Namely, a situation
in which a taxpayer is required to pay taxes in respect of income that taxpayer has not yet
relized.
149
For a discussion of anti-deferral regimes in general, see REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH,
INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX
REGIME 125-149 (2007) (Discussing the legal development in the United States of various
anti-deferral regimes) [hereinafter: INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW).
150
“Subpart F” is the commonly used shorthand for Chapter 1, Subchapter N, Part II,
Subpart F of the I.R.C. It is codified in I.R.C. §§951-65.
151
I.R.C. §951. A foreign corporation is a CFC if U.S. Shareholders own more than 50%
of its vote or value. I.R.C. §957. A U.S. Shareholder is any U.S. person owning at least 10%
of the vote of the CFC. I.R.C. §951.
152
This includes, for example, income from dividends royalties, rents, interest and other
typed of income not generated by passive participation. See, I.R.C. §§952-54
153
In the absence of Subpart F, a U.S. shareholder could set up a wholly owned foreign
corporation in a tax haven, and earn all income through that corporation, thus avoiding U.S.
taxation. As originally conceived, the idea of Subpart F was to force U.S. shareholders to
currently include in income any profits earned by a controlled foreign corporation. The
eventual political compromise led to the current regime, under which shareholders currently
include only passive income, while active CFC income is not included in shareholders’
income until repatriation to the United States. For a description of the Kennedy
Administration’s proposal and the eventual political compromise, see Luke Wagner, Crisis
and Deferral: How World Events Influence Subpart F, 152 TAX NOTES 1027 (Aug. 15, 2016).
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to avoid tax on repatriated earnings, however, by having the CFC directly
invest its non-Subpart F earnings in the United States. To prevent that, the
I.R.C. deemed any CFC’s increase in net-investment in the United States also
distributed to shareholders, and immediately taxable to them.154 The TCJA
made this rule unnecessary, since under the new law CFC’s non-Subpart F
income is not subject to tax upon repatriation (though the rule is relevant to
inversion transactions I discuss below).
Another anti-deferral regime is the Passive Foreign Investment Company
(PFIC) regime. It has a similar logic to the CFC regime. The idea, again, is
to prevent shareholders from stuffing income into foreign holding companies
in order defer U.S. tax liability. This regime, however, targets individual
shareholders. A PFIC is any foreign corporation if at least 75% of the gross
income derived from passive income (the “income test”), or if at least 50%
the corporation’s assets are passive-income-producing assets (the “assets
test”).155 For that purpose, cash and cash equivalents are passive assets.156
Thus, a public corporation that accumulates cash and cash equivalents may
become a PFIC. Any U.S. person that holds stock in a PIFC is subject to one
of three anti-deferral regimes. One of such regimes is the “Qualified Electing
Fund” (QEF), under which PFIC gains are immediately taxable to
shareholders, even if no corporate distribution was made.157
The CFC and PFIC regimes are but two examples for regimes in which
“in-corporate” operations directly affect shareholder-level tax liabilities.
When a manager makes a decision to invest in certain types of assets, or earn
certain types of income, the result may be immediate shareholder-level tax.
ii. Deemed Dispositions
Mergers and acquisition (knows in tax jargon as “reorganizations”),158 are
another type of corporate event that may be taxable to shareholders.159 The
154

I.R.C. § 956, as in effect in 2017.
I.R.C. §1297
156
Notice 88-22, Passive Foreign Investment Company Provisions Operation of the
Definitional Tests under Section 1296, 1988-11 I.R.B. 19 (Feb. 26, 1988) (concluding that
“[c]ash and other current assets readily convertible into cash” are passive assets for PFIC
qualification purposes).
157
I.R.C. §§ 1293-95
158
I.R.C. § 368.
159
BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND GIFTS ¶ 94.1, 1997 WL 439996, 1 (“To the general practitioner, the term ordinarily
connotes a financial rehabilitation of a bankrupt enterprise. To the tax lawyer, however, it
embraces a much wider variety of corporate readjustments—most of which have the flavor
of prosperity rather than depression. Section 368(a)(1) defines “reorganization” for tax
purposes to include mergers, consolidations, recapitalizations, acquisitions by one
corporation of the stock or assets of another corporation, and changes in form or place of
155
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tax treatment of corporate reorganizations is probably one of the most
intricate areas of tax law. The guiding principle, however, is that certain
reorganization that maintain continuity of the original ownership and
business activity should not be taxable.160 The reason for this tax-favored
treatment is to allow business-driven restructuring transactions to proceed
unaffected by tax considerations.
For example, in a statutory merger of two corporations, shareholders of
the merged corporations replace their shares in the “old” corporation for
shares in the newly merged corporation. Under general principles of tax law,
the disposition of one asset (old stock), in consideration for another asset (the
new stock), would be a taxable event. In the case of statutory mergers,
however, I.R.C. §368(a)(1)(A) exempts such exchanges from tax if certain
requirements are met. Multiple other code provisions prescribe various
requirements for tax-free treatment for multiple types of reorganizations.161
Some corporate acquisitions, however, are deemed to create enough of a
difference compared with the structure before the transaction, to be taxable
to shareholders. Thus, in many instances, a merger or a corporate acquisition
is taxable to shareholders even if shareholders receive no cash in the
transaction. The exchange by a shareholder of “old” stock for “new” stock is
a taxable event. In such a case, the taxable gain is the difference between the
shareholder’s basis in “old” stock, and the fair market value of “new” stock.
Another example for deemed disposition comes up in the context of
PFICs discussed above. Instead of making a QEF election and pay tax on
deemed distributions,162 shareholders can elect to mark-to-market their stock
at the end of each taxable year, and recognize any gains or losses as if they
sold their stock on the last day of the year.163 Thus, if managers’ actions cause
a corporation to become a PFIC, the result may be a deemed disposition to
shareholders at the end of each taxable year.164
To summarize, corporate transactions driven by “in-corporate”
considerations may cause shareholders to be treated—for tax purposes—as if
organization.”)
160
Id. (“Requisite to a reorganization under the Code are a continuity of the business
enterprise...under the modified corporate form...and a continuity of interest...In order to
exclude transactions not intended to be included, the specifications of the reorganization
provisions of the law are precise”).
161
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 351, 355, 368.
162
Supra note 157 and accompanying text.
163
I.R.C. § 1296.
164
The third anti-deferral alternative for shareholder in PFIC is not to pay tax until an
actual corporation distribution. I.R.C. § 1291. In such a case, however, shareholders are
liable to interest on the tax liability of any deferred amount. This would be the default rule if
no QEF election is made, and not mark-to-market election is available.
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they sold their stock, even though shareholders did not receive cash
consideration, and did not actually dispose of any of their holdings.
iii. Forced Distributions
A final category of in-corporate decisions that may create tax liability for
shareholders comes up in instances in which the I.R.C. requires that a
corporation make distributions to its shareholders, thus generating
shareholder-level tax liability. Forced distributions are generally required
(among other qualifications) to qualify for certain tax-preferred corporate
regimes. The most common examples are REITs (Real Estate Investment
Trusts) and RICs (Regulated Investment Companies).
Both REITs and RICs are classified as corporations for federal income
tax purposes.165 Qualifying as a REIT or a RIC, however, allows the
corporation to deduct dividend payments to shareholders.166 This effectively
eliminates the double-tax, as the corporate profits are only taxes once – to the
shareholders. The purposes of these preferred-tax regimes’ is to incentivize
small and medium-size investors to pool resources and invest in specific asset
categories.
Both RIC and REITs have to meet certain income and assets tests167, as
well as certain ownership thresholds tests168 in order to qualify for the
preferred treatment. Most importantly, however, both must distribute at least
90% of their profits each year to their shareholders.169
Of course, shareholders know if a corporation is a REIT or a RIC before
they decide to purchase its stock, and can therefore decide whether on-going
taxable distributions match their individual tax preferences. However, in
many instances regular “double-taxed” corporations may choose to turn
themselves into REITs in the course of their lives (“REIT conversion
transactions” or “REIT Spinoffs” are discussed below).170 In such a case, a
taxable shareholder who already holds stock may suffer a tax cost associated
with the conversion transaction.
b. Corporate Inversions
Over the past few decades, multiple U.S. multinationals engaged in
inversion transactions.171 The purpose of a corporate inversion is to turn a
165
I.R.C. §851 (RICs); I.R.C. 856 (REITs). The result is a functional adoption of the
dividend deduction model of corporate integration.
166
I.R.C. §852 (RICs); I.R.C. 857 (REITs).
167
The requirements are prescribed by I.R.C. §851 (RICs); I.R.C. 856 (REITs).
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
See discussion infra, at Part III.c.
171
For a detailed description of the corporate inversion phenomenon, see, Omri Marian,
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domestic corporation into a foreign corporation for tax purposes. Generally,
in an inversion transaction a U.S. multinational corporation acquires a smaller
foreign corporation through a merger in which the foreign corporation is the
surviving entity. Thus, shareholders of the U.S. corporation maintain control
of the foreign merged entity. The underlying rational is that by gaining
foreign status, the corporation will be able to reduce its tax liability.172 The
inversion transaction itself, however, is usually taxable to shareholders.
Corporate inversions thus fit the STCT category of “forced dispositions”
discussed above. As detailed in this Subpart, corporate inversions are a vivid
representation of the unique governance problems created by STCTs.
Inversion transactions have been very popular in recent years. A recent
paper analyzing inversions counts sixty inversion transactions between 1993
and 2015.173 At least forty-eight of such transactions took place on or after
2002.174 Such transaction are not only popular in terms of absolute numbers,
but also significant in dollar value. A recent study by the Congressional
Budget Office found that in 2014 alone, “10 corporations—with assets
totaling approximately $300 billion—announced that they were considering
inversions”.175
i. The Corporate Inversions Phenomenon
In order to understand the structure of corporate inversion transactions
and potential tax benefits, it is helpful to start with a brief background on U.S.
tax law applicable to cross-border transactions.
Under the law in effect before the TCJA, the United States generally
imposed tax on its domestic corporations’ worldwide income.176 In order to
prevent double taxation, domestic corporations receive a credit for foreign
tax payments.177 Foreign corporations, however, generally only pay tax in the
United States on income earned from sources within the United States.178
Most other countries tax multinational corporations on a territorial
basis.179 That is, only income earned within the geographical boundaries of
Home Country Effects of Corporate Inversions, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7-13 (2015) (describing
corporate inversions). Hereinafter: Marian, Home Country Effects.
172
Id., at 11-13 (discussing the reasons for which corporations invert).
173
Babkin, Glover, & Levine supra note 20.
174
Nirupama Rao, Corporate Inversions and Economic Performance, NYU WAGNER
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 2566429 (2015) (analyzing forty-eight inversions that happened since
2002) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2566429.
175
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE INVERSIONS 7
(2017).
176
I.R.C. §11(a), (d).
177
I.R.C. §901.
178
I.R.C. §§881, 882
179
See Philip Dittmer, TAX FOUND., SPECIAL REPORT NO. 202: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
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the jurisdiction is subject to tax, regardless if the corporate taxpayer is foreign
or domestic. With the TCJA, the United States adopted a similar approach.180
Prior to the reform, some argued that U.S. multinationals are at a
competitive disadvantage because they face taxation on worldwide earnings,
while non-U.S. multinationals face territorial taxation.181 Such disadvantage
was exacerbated by the fact that the United States used to have the highest
corporate tax rate in the industrialized world.182 According to such
competitiveness arguments, inversions were a response to these
disadvantages.183 Other commentators, however, argue that U.S.
multinationals faced no competitive disadvantage, due to multiple loopholes
in the U.S. tax system that enable U.S. multinationals to legally reduce their
tax rate.184 Rather, U.S. multinationals engaged in inversions simply because
they could. It is rational for managers to engage in legal transactions that
reduce corporate tax liabilities.185
Notwithstanding the U.S. worldwide system of taxation, not all income
of U.S. corporations was immediately taxable in the United States. Income
earned by foreign subsidiaries was not taxed until repatriated back to the
ON
TERRITORIAL
TAXATION
3
(2012),
available
at
http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/ files/docs/sr202_0.pdf (concluding that
“[o]verwhelmingly, developed economies are turning to the territorial approach”).
180
TCJA, supra note 38, § 14101 (establishing a deduction for dividends received from
foreign sources).
181
Omri Marian, Meaningless Comparisons: Corporate Tax Reform Discourse in the
United States, 33 VA. TAX REV. 133, 164 (2012) (“Proponents of territoriality argue that the
isolation of the United States in taxing its corporations on a worldwide basis puts U.S. MNCs
at a competitive disadvantage”).
182
See Jane G. Gravelle, International Corporate Tax Rates Comparisons and Policy
Implications, R41743 CONG. RES. SERV. 1 (2014) (“Advocates of cutting corporate tax rates
frequently make their argument based on the higher statutory rate observed in the United
States as compared with the rest of the world”).
183
Edward D. Kleinbard, ‘Competitiveness’ has Nothing to Do with It, 144 TAX NOTES
1055, 1056 (September 1, 2014) (describing U.S. multinationals’ claim “that U.S. tax law
has rendered them uncompetitive in international business, which in turn explains the sudden
wave of inversion transactions”).
184
Id., at 1056 (explaining that U.S. multinational face no competitive disadvantage due
to their ability to engage in income shifting); See, also Marian, Home Country Effects, supra
note 171171, at 10 (describing the competitiveness argument as “tenuous”); Reuven S. AviYonah & Omri Marian, Inversions and Competitiveness: Reflections in the Wake of PfizerAllergan, 41 INT'L TAX J. 39, 39 (2015) (suggesting that U.S. multinationals “engage in the
inversions simply because they can and that inversions have nothing to do with maintaining
a competitive edge”).
185
Kleinbard, supra note 183, at 1055 (describing inversions as “economically rational
deals”). I am making no judgment here on whether inversions are driven by competitiveness
considerations. The assumption I am making here is that inversions are legal, and that they
reduce the corporate-level tax liability. As such, management should—at the minimum—
consider inversions.
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United States (usually in the form of a dividend), assuming the foreign
corporation is not a CFC, or, if it is a CFC, the income is not Subpart F
income.186
A system of worldwide taxation that allows for tax-deferral created an
incentive for U.S. multinationals to accumulate income in foreign
subsidiaries. U.S. multinationals indeed used various “profits shifting”
techniques to “stuff” income into foreign affiliates. Profit Shifting refers to
the ability of the taxpayer to shift income—for tax reporting purposes—from
a high-tax jurisdiction to a low-tax jurisdiction, without relocating the
corresponding activity that generated the income.187 As long as the income
remained in the foreign subsidiaries, it was not taxed to the U.S. parent. The
magnitude of the problem was staggering. By one recent estimate, before the
TCJA, U.S.-based multinational corporations held $2.6 trillion of untaxed (or
lightly taxed) earnings in offshore affiliates.188
Such a system creates an incentive to invert. There are three main benefits
associated with an inversion: First, as a foreign corporation, an inverted
corporation it subject to tax in the U.S. only on U.S.-source income, rather
than on worldwide income. Second, an inverted corporation is able to easily
access the piles of cash accumulated in offshore subsidiaries. If the offshore
subsidiaries pay dividend to the now-foreign parent, the funds are never
“repatriated” to the United States (but rather “repatriated” to the foreign
parent), and no tax on is ever due. Finally, if the ultimate parent corporation
is foreign, income shifting away from the United States becomes much easier.
For example, it is highly unlikely that a foreign publicly traded corporation
is a CFC (due to the dispersed ownership).189 Thus, income shifted to the
foreign parent is never Subpart F income and will never be deemed
repatriated to the United States.
In order for U.S. corporations to enjoy the tax benefits of an inversion,
they must first gain foreign tax status. Moving real operations out of the
United States is costly, and such costs may undo the benefits of an
186

There are various legal ways for U.S. multinational to get around the CFC rules and
there seem to be a consensus that the CFC regime is not an effective anti-deferral mechanism.
See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming Jr., Robert J. Peroni, & Stephen E. Shay, Worse Than Exemption,
59 EMORY L. J., 79, 93 (2009) (CFC “provisions do not reach substantial amounts of lowtaxed foreign source earnings.”); Lawrence Lokken, Whatever Happened to Subpart F? U.S.
CFC Legislation after the Check-the-Box Regulations, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 186, 210 (2005)
(concluding that “subpart F has fallen increasingly short of the goal of curbing tax haven
sheltering”).
187
For an authoritative discussion on the income-shifting phenomenon, see Edward D.
Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 (2011)
188
See House Ways & Means Committee Press Release, Joint Committee on Taxation
Estimates Even More Foreign Earnings from U.S. Companies Stranded Overseas (Sept. 29,
2016).
189
See, supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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inversion.190 There was no need for U.S. multinationals, however, to move
real activities in order to gain foreign tax status. Under the I.R.C., a
corporation is tax-resident in the United States only if it is incorporated in the
United States.191 Thus, in order to invert, all that a U.S. multinational has to
do is to change its place of incorporation.
Inversion transactions became popular in the 1980s. At that time, U.S.
corporations engaged in inversions simply by changing their place of
incorporation from the U.S. to tax havens such as Bermuda.192 For the most
part, the change of incorporation was simply a formality. No change of
ownership or operations followed. These inversions were known as “naked
inversions”. Early transactions took advantage of certain code provisions
granting tax-free treatments for reorganizations, so the inversions themselves
were tax-free. The IRS responded with regulatory actions that made certain
inversion taxable to shareholders, if at least 50% of the shareholders of the
“pre-inversion” domestic corporation remained shareholders of the new
foreign-incorporated corporation.193 In such circumstances, shareholders are
treated as is if they dispose their stock in the “old” domestic corporation in a
taxable exchange, and receive in return stock of the “new” foreign
corporation.
If the inversion is taxable, the tax burden on shareholders depends on their
basis in their shares, their holding period in their shares, and their level of
income. As explained above, taxable gain on the disposition of capital assets
is the difference between the fair market value at the time of disposition and
taxpayer’s basis.194 The lower the basis, the higher the taxable gain is.
The holding period in the shares determines the tax rate applicable to
gain. If an asset is held for a period longer than a year, then upon disposition,
the gain is taxed at preferred long-term capital gains (LTCG) rates.195 The
I.R.C. prescribes a progressive rate for LTCG, depending on the taxpayer’s
income. Currently, the highest LTCG rate is twenty percent.196 In addition to
the capital gains tax, investors who earn income above certain thresholds are
190

Marian, Home Country Effects, supra note 171, at 4 (“when the dislocation of real
economic attributes is necessary in order to [invert], tax savings may not justify the cost of
such dislocation”).
191
I.R.C. §7701(a)(4). This formal rule is quite exceptional. Most other countries
employ substantive rules to determine corporate residence. See, Omri Marian, 54 B.C. L.
REV. 1613, 1657-1658 (2013) (describing U.S. exceptionalism in adopting a formal
corporate tax-residence test).
192
Marian, Home Country Effects, supra note 171, at 7-8 (describing the “first wave” of
corporate inversions).
193
Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(c).
194
I.R.C. §1001. For most taxpayers corporate stock are classified as capital assets.
Stock in the hands of dealers and traders in securities are likely to be classified as inventory.
195
I.R.C. §1222(3).
196
I.R.C. §1(h)(1)(D).
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also subject to 3.8% tax on investment income.197 Thus, shareholders who
have held the stock for long periods may be subject to a total federal tax rate
of 23.8% on their “gain” from an inversion transaction, even though they may
have realized nothing. Moreover, the tax burden is higher once state and local
taxes are considered.
If the shareholders had held the stock for a period of a year or less, the
applicable rates will be short-term capital gains (STCG) rates.198 STCG rates
are generally the taxpayer’s marginal bracket rates, which—depending on the
taxpayer income—were be as high as 39.6% before the TCJA (and 37% after
the TCJA). 199 Adding the 3.8% investment tax on top means that some
investors may see their “gain” taxed at a rate of 43.4%.
Notwithstanding the regulatory changes that made inversions taxable to
shareholders, inversions remained popular well into the early 2000s. These
transactions, however, received unfavorable public attention.200 Congress
finally responded in 2004, by enacting the “anti-inversion” rules, codified in
I.R.C. sections 7874 and 4985.201 Section 7874 aims at the corporate level,
while section 4985 targets managers.
Section 7874 denies the benefits of an inversion to the corporation itself.
Specifically, Section 7874 creates two thresholds for ownership
“continuation” that determine the tax treatment of an inverted corporation. If
at least eighty percent of the shareholders (by vote or value) of the new
foreign corporation are shareholders of the old domestic corporation, the
foreign corporation is treated as “domestic” for tax purposes
(notwithstanding its foreign incorporation).202 If sixty percent of the
shareholders of the new “foreign” corporation (but less than eighty percent)
were shareholders of the old corporation, then the inverted corporation is
unfavorably taxed in the U.S. for a period of ten years.203 An exception
prescribes that if the new inverted corporation has “substantial business
activity” in the foreign jurisdiction, Section 7874 does not apply.204 The logic
is not to penalize transactions that are driven by substantive business
197

I.R.C. §1411(a).
I.R.C. §1222(1).
199
I.R.C. §1(a)-(d).
200
Hale E. Sheppard, Flight or Fight of U.S.-Based Multinational Business: Analyzing
the Causes for, Effects of, and Solutions to the Corporate Inversion Trend, 23 NW. J. INT’L
L. & BUS. 551, 557–58 (2003) (describing how corporate inversions were perceived by
media and policy makers in the early 2000s).
201
P.L. 108-357 2004 (American Jobs Creation Act of 2004), §§ 801(a), 802(a).
202
I.R.C. § 7874(b).
203
I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B).
204
I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii). The “substantial business activity” threshold is generally
met if at least twenty five percent of the assets, income and employees of the foreign
corporations are located in the foreign jurisdiction. Treas. Reg. 1.7874-3.
198
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considerations.
While IRC 7874 successfully shut down “naked inversions”, other types
of inversions transactions continued. After the enactment of Section 7874,
U.S. multinationals engaged in inversions by merging with much smaller
foreign corporate targets, but just large enough to avoid the sixty or eighty
percent thresholds. Such transactions are almost always taxable to
shareholders, because shareholders of the inverted corporation wish to
maintain control of the merged entity. As a result, the transactions cross the
fifty-percent ownership threshold that makes the transactions taxable.205 In
response to this more recent wave of inversions, Treasury had issued three
different sets of intricate guidance and regulations aimed at preventing
inversions,206 with some success.207
The other Congressional response to inversions—Section 4985—
discourage inversions by imposing an excise tax on managers. As noted, in
most inversion transactions shareholders are required to recognize gain as if
they sold their share of the inverted corporation in exchange for shares of the
“new” foreign entity. Managers may hold shares in the corporation they
manage, and thus suffer the shareholder-level tax like other shareholders.
Managers, however, may hold substantial part of their performance-based
compensation not in stock, but in other types of equity derivatives such as
stock options. Many such compensatory instruments are not taxable in an
inversion (or in other corporate mergers for that matter).208 In enacting
Section 4985, Congress recognized this fact, expressing concern that “while
shareholders are generally required to recognize gain upon stock inversion
transactions, executives holding stock options and certain stock-based
compensation are not taxed upon such transactions.”209 To address this
problem, section 4985 imposes excise tax on executives’ stock-based
205

See, supra note 193 and accompanying text.
Notice 2014-52, Rules Regarding Inversions and Related Transactions, 2014-42
I.R.B. 712 (Sep. 22, 2014); Notice 2015-79, Additional Rules Regarding Inversions and
Related Transactions, 2015-49 I.R.B. 775 (Dec. 2, 2015); T.D. 9790, 81 F.R. 72858-72984
(Oct. 21, 2016) (promulgating regulations to deny certain tax benefits of inversion
transactions).
207
Andrew Velrade & Zoe Sagalow, As Inversion Dries Up, FDI Fell in 2016, TAX
NOTES INT’L (Jul. 24, 2017) (Crediting the Obama Administration’s regulatory guidance
with stopping several planned inversion transactions).
208
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the tax consequences of equity-based
compensation. Many types of such compensation, however, are not treated as deemed
disposed equity in an inversion. Even if it is, such compensatory instruments are frequently
drafted to allow management significant control of the timing of taxable gain recognition.
For a discussion of tax planning advantages of certain types of performance-based executive
pay, see, David I. Walker, The Way We Pay Now: Understanding and Evaluating
Performance-Based Executive Pay, 1 J. OF L. FIN. & ACC’ING 395 (2016).
209
H.R. REP. 108-548(I), 246.
206
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compensation.210 Generally, the tax is imposed a rate of 15% on gross value
of equity-based compensation of top executives.211 The executives are
individually liable for the tax.212 The idea is to make sure that an inversion
transaction is taxable to managers, forcing them to internalize shareholderlevel tax cost associated with the inversion. Section 4985 piggybacks off the
Section 7874 thresholds. That is, the excise tax is only applicable if
shareholders of the pre-inversion corporation own at least sixty percent of the
inverted corporation.213 Thus, it is theoretically possible to structure
inversions that are taxable to shareholders but not to managers. This will
happen if the transaction pass the fifty-percent ownership threshold (and
hence taxable to shareholders) but not the sixty percent threshold (and hence
does not trigger the excise tax on managers).
ii. Corporate Inversions as STCTs
Inversion transactions present an obvious case of the governance
problems associated with STCTs. For example, when Medtronic announced
its plan to invert by merging with Irish-based Covidien (itself an inverted
corporation), the board—in recommending the transaction for shareholders’
approval—noted that “the combined company’s effective tax rate will be
reduced by about one to two percentage points compared with the companies’
estimated blended rate.”214 While a two-percentage point reduction in
effective tax rate is a desirable corporate-level outcome, the transaction was
taxable to shareholders.215 The Medtronic board was aware of this fact, noting
in the registration statement “the merger is expected to be taxable for U.S.
federal income tax purposes to the Medtronic shareholders, which could
particularly affect long-term Medtronic shareholders with a low basis.”216
210

I.R.C. § 4985(a).
As of Jan. 1, 2018, the § 4985 excise tax is imposed at a rate of 20%. See, TCJA
supra note 38, § 13064.
212
I.R.C. §4985(b). At the time of the enactment the fifteen percent rate was equivalent
to the rate imposed on long term capital gains, which would be the rate faced by shareholders
who have held their stock in the corporation for a period longer than a year. The intent was
to make the rate imposed on managers equivalent to the rate imposed on shareholders. Since
then, however, the long-term capital gains tax rate has increased to twenty percent. See, I.R.C
1(h)(1). Congress, however, did not amend Section 4985 to maintain the parity between
shareholders and managers. See, Walker, Another Critical Look, supra note 30, at fn. 9.
213
I.R.C. §4985(c).
214
Medtronic Holdings Limited, Registration Statement (Form S-4/A) 93 (Nov. 20,
2014). Hereinafter: Medtronic Registration Statement.
215
Id., at 24 (“For U.S. federal income tax purposes, the receipt of New Medtronic
ordinary shares and cash in lieu of fractional New Medtronic ordinary shares in exchange for
Medtronic common shares pursuant to the merger will be a taxable transaction”).
216
Id., at 94.
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An expected corporate-level tax savings of “one to two percent”
compared with shareholder-level tax as high as 23.8%,217 suggests that some
taxable shareholders may have suffered a net loss. Indeed, shortly after the
transaction, minority taxable shareholders filed a class action against
Medtronic, arguing, among others, that shareholders lost value due to the fact
they were required to pay capital gains taxes in the inversion.218
Shareholders made similar claims in a class action filed after Johnson
Controls inverted by merging Tyco (Tyco itself was also an inverted
corporation). In that case, some of the plaintiffs were Jonson Control’s
retirees who received stock as an incentive pay.219 These retirees had a very
low basis in the stock, which caused most of their stock value to be subject
to tax in the inversion. The plaintiffs alleged that—taking into account state
and local taxes—the resulting tax burden was “more than a third” of their
value of their Jonson Controls stock.220
Nonetheless, shareholders approved both the Johnson Controls and
Medtronic inversions. There is no surprise here. It is reasonable to assume
that tax-exempt shareholders owned the majority shares in both cases.221 For
tax-exempt shareholders, the inversion is always wealth-increasing, so they
will rationally vote to approve the inversion. The plaintiffs in the Jonson
Controls class action specifically noted the conflict of interest between
taxable and tax-exempt shareholders.222
As evident from the Johnson Controls and the Medtronic shareholders
suits, inversions “[present] a dilemma in that difference in the personal tax
statuses of shareholders can lead to disagreement over the optimal corporate
policy.”223 In a recent study, Babkin, Glover, & Levine empirically analyze
217

Shareholders with low basis likely have held the shares for a period longer than a
year, so long term capital gains rates (rather than short term capital gains rates) are likely
applicable.
218
In re Medtronic, supra note 21, at 410 (Minn. 2017) (”The allegations of the
Amended Complaint explain that the shareholders are harmed because the tax liability is
imposed on them solely in their status as shareholders. Medtronic itself did not incur a
capital-gains tax liability on the transaction, and therefore could not recover for the injury
caused by this alleged harm… [T]he court of appeals correctly held that claims asserting this
harm are direct”).
219

Johnson Controls Complaint, supra note 21, at ¶ 138. (“Defendants knew its
employees and retirees had little or no basis--i.e., large gains--because those employees and
retirees bought their stock from JCI”). Hereinafter:
220
Id., at ¶ 101
221
See, supra note 19 and accompanying discussion.
222
Johnson Controls Complaint, supra note 21, at ¶100 (“While the deal's expected tax
avoidance opportunities will, if realized, benefit JC plc and its non-taxpaying shareholders…
that benefit will not be shared by the Minority Taxpaying JCI Shareholders”);
223
Babkin, Glover, & Levine supra note 20, at 228.
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sixty inversion transactions, and find that “the aggregate effect [of inversions]
across all shareholders (taxable and tax-exempt) is a 3.0% increase in
value.”224 However, “[f]or an investor with a holding period greater than 3
years, half of the inversions… result in a negative after-tax return.”225 For a
simulated California-based high-net-worth taxable investor, Babkin, Glover,
& Levine find that—after taking into account local taxes—an inversion
results in a 20.6% loss of value, on average.226
Babkin, Glover, & Levine study shows that inversions are usually not
Pareto-optimal. This suggests that “an inversion results in a wealth transfer
between shareholders.”227 While they do find inversions to be efficient
overall, it is plausible that some inversion transactions are inefficient across
shareholders (meaning, the value lost to taxable shareholders outweighs the
gain to tax-exempt shareholders). This is a reasonable assumption, because
Babkin, Glover, & Levine finding of 3.0% aggregate value increase is an
average for all transactions they report. Such a low average benefit suggests
that it is possible that outlier transactions result in an overall loss for
shareholders. There is also some empirical evidence suggesting that this may
be the case. For example, market reaction to inversion announcements has
been mixed, with some corporations losing value after inversions.228 Since
inversions save corporate-level taxes, one would expect a positive market
reaction to inversion announcements. The mixed reaction suggests that
corporate tax savings are potentially offset by other costs. One such cost may
be shareholder-level taxes. If taxable shareholders own a large enough
percentage of the inverted corporation, one can envision a plausible scenario
under which shareholder-level tax cost is higher than corporate-level tax
savings.
Another cost that may undo the tax-benefit, is the corporate governance
cost. For example, Cortes et. al. empirical analysis of governance
mechanisms in inverted corporations find that “[f]irms that invert award
executive pay that is less sensitive to stock prices, have greater protection
from hostile takeovers, higher bid-ask spread and lower institutional
ownership.”229 This suggests, they argue, that corporate governance suffers
after an inversion.
224

Id., at 1.
Id.
226
Id., at 24.
227
Id., at 25.
228
Rao, supra note 174, at 13.
229
Felipe Cortes, Armando Gomes & Radhakrishnan Gopalan, The Effect of Inversions
on Corporate Governance 5 (2016). https://ssrn.com/abstract=2481345; See also, Day,
supra note, 144, at 458 (2016) (Noting that in inversions “shareholders vote in favor of--and
thus authorize--the very transactions that limit their ability to acquire information and
enforce other shareholder rights”).
225
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Inversions also create a unique governance problem relating to
managerial incentives. As noted, one Congressional response to the inversion
phenomenon was to impose an excise tax on top executives in inverted
corporations, in order to align executives’ tax-interest with the interest of
taxable shareholders.230 Management response, however, was to structure
transactions to include management tax “gross-up” payments.231 For
example, the Medtronic inversion transaction included a “gross-up payment
to each director and executive officer of Medtronic with respect to any excise
taxes that may be imposed pursuant to Section 4985 of the Code”232, for a
total cost of $72 million.233 It is rational for tax-exempt shareholders to agree
to such additional cost. Medtronic registration statement estimated the tax
savings from the transaction at about one to two percent reduction in effective
rate. For 2014, Medtronic reported $780 million in tax payments. A two
percent reduction would result in an immediate tax saving of $15.6 million.
It will only take a few years for the corporate tax savings to outweigh the
immediate cost of the gross-up. Shareholders in the Medtronic lawsuit
alleged specific harm because of such gross-up payment, which was not
available to all other shareholders.234
The Johnson Controls transaction offers an interesting twist to the
problem of managerial rent extraction in STCTs. In that case—some
shareholders claim—instead of having the corporation gross-up managers,
managers structured the transaction to avoid the excise tax altogether. Recall,
that the excise tax is applicable to the extent that Section 7874 is applicable,
meaning, if the transaction crosses the sixty-percent continuity of ownership
threshold. The Jonson Control’s/Tyco inversion was a reverse acquisition, in
which Tyco formally acquired Johnson Controls for a combination of cash
and stock. After the transaction, former shareholders of Johnson Controls
held fifty-six percent of the merged corporation, just below the sixty percent
threshold.235 Thus, while the transaction was a taxable to shareholders, it did
not qualify as an “inversion” for purposes of the Section 4985 excise tax.
Shareholders in the Johnson Controls litigation argued that the management
achieved the “below-sixty” threshold by undervaluing Johnson Controls’
230

See, supra notes 194-199 and accompanying discussion.
Ajay Gupta, News Analysis: Grossing Up an Inversion Tax, 75 TAX NOTES INT’L
806 (Sep. 8, 2014) “Grossing up [managers for] the section 4985 excise tax appears to be the
norm in inversion transactions.”
232
Medtronic Registration Statement, supra note 214, at 22.
233
Id.
234
Supra note 218.
235
Tyco International PLC, Registration Statement (Form S-4) 1 (Jul. 1, 2016) “After
consummation of the merger, Johnson Controls shareholders and Tyco shareholders are
expected to own approximately 56% and 44%, respectively, of the issued and outstanding
ordinary shares of the combined company”).
231
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stock, and by forcing shareholders to receive a partial cash payment for their
stock.236 A higher valuation that included no cash compensation would have
required that Johnson Controls shareholders receive a higher share of the
merged entity’s equity, thus potentially crossing the sixty percent threshold.
The avoidance of the excise tax, shareholders argued, “was accomplished by
the improper dilution of [Johnson Controls] shareholders' equity interest.”237
At this time, both the Johnson Controls and the Medtronic inversions are
still being litigated. Other inversion transactions also resulted in lawsuits
relating to shareholder-level tax cost.238 Regardless of what the outcomes
may be, ongoing inversion litigation vividly demonstrate the unique
governance challenges of STCTs.
c. REIT Spinoffs and REIT Conversions
REIT spinoffs transactions (and the conceptually similar REIT
conversion transactions),239 became a common tax-reducing scheme in the
early 2000s.240 REIT spinoffs received popular and academic attention.241
Many viewed such transactions as an abusive form of corporate tax
planning,242 and in 2015 Congress eventually intervened to prevent such
transactions.243 Commentators, however, have given little attention to the
236

Johnson Controls Complaint, supra note 21, at ¶ 13 (“The under-60% ownership was
accomplished by JCplc's cash payment of $3.86 billion to JCI shareholders in lieu of JCplc
stock--i.e., JCI/JCplc forced JCI shareholders to sell to it $3.86 billion (approximately 17%)
of JCI shares at a substantial discount … and by using the same steeply discounted value …
to determine the exchange ratio of JCI shares for JCplc shares…”).
237
Id., at ¶7.
238
See, e.g., Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, Steamfitters Local
449 Pension Plan v. Eaton Corp. PLC., 2016 WL 3963518 (S.D.N.Y.) (alleging that as a
result of an inversion transaction, a previously announced tax-free spinoff will become
taxable to shareholders).
239
Borden, for example, refers to REIT conversions as the “cousin” for REIT spinoffs.
See, Borden, supra note 20, at 529.
240
Goolsbee & Maydew, supra note 32, at 442-443 (describing 2001 changes in IRS
practices that made REIT spinoffs possible); Martin A. Sullivan, The Revenue Costs of
Nontraditional REITs, 144 TAX NOTES 1103 (Sep. 8, 2014) (examining twenty REIT spinoff
and conversion transactions between 1999 and 2015).
241
See, e.g., Id.; Borden, supra note 20; Liz Moyer, R.E.I.T. Spinoffs in Washington’s Cross
Hairs,
N.Y.
Times
(Dec.
15,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/09/business/dealbook/reit-spinoffs-in-washingtonscross-hairs.html?_r=1; Liz Hoffman, IRS Raises Red Flag on Real-Estate Spinoffs, Wall St.
J. (Sep. 15, 2015, 7:16 PM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/irs-raises-red-flag-on-real-estatespinoffs-1442359003.
242
Borden, supra note 20, at 529-30 (describing the negative attention to REIT spinoff
and conversion transactions).
243
P.L. 114-113, Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 §311(a) (2015),
codified in I.R.C. § 355(h) (Severely restricting tax-free treatment for REIT spinoff
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unique governance issues arising in REIT spinoffs. REIT spinoffs turn a
regular corporation—the income of which is subject to double taxation—into
a corporation the income of which is taxed only once. However, the single
tax is achieved through a “forced distribution” regime.244 As a result,
shareholders pay a personal tax cost for a corporate-level tax benefit. It is not
always clear that that the corporate tax savings outweigh the shareholder tax
costs.
i. Background: The Tax Benefits of REIT Spinoffs
REITs are collective investment vehicles “through which small investors
can pool their resources in order to invest in real estate and mortgages on real
estate”.245 REITs are corporations for tax purposes. Unlike regular
corporations, REITs receive a deduction for dividends paid to investors.246
The I.R.C. prescribes multiple intricate requirements for REIT
qualifications, aimed to assure that they functions as a pooled real-estate
investment vehicle.247 For example, at least 75 percent of a REIT’s gross
income must be from passive real-estate related payments (such as rents, or
disposition of real property at a gain).248 In addition, at least 75 percent of the
value of a REIT’s total assets must be attributable to real estate assets, cash
and cash items.249 The most important qualifying requirement for our purpose
is that a REIT must distribute ninety percent of its profits each year.250 Since
REIT dividends are deductible, this requirement functionally assures that tax
at the corporate level is eliminated (or almost completely eliminated).
The elimination of the corporate level tax, however, comes at a cost:
shareholders relinquish control on the timing of gain recognition.251 In the
case of regular corporations, shareholders can choose to invest in
corporations with a policy of minimum dividend distribution, and thus defer
gain recognition until disposition of the stock. REITs, however, must
distributed all (or most) of their profits each year.252 Shareholders must
therefore recognize gain on dividends received and pay tax. In addition,
unlike dividends distributed by “regular” corporations, most REIT dividends
transactions, by making the spinoff transaction a taxable transaction).
244
See, discussion supra at Part III.a.iii.
245
David F. Levy, Nickolas P. Gianou & Kevin M. Jones, Modern REITs and the
Corporate Tax: Thoughts on the Scope of the Corporate Tax and Rationalizing Our System
of Taxing Collective Investment Vehicles, TAXES—THE TAX MAG. 217, 219 (Mar. 2016).
246
I.R.C. § 857.
247
I.R.C. § 856
248
I.R.C. § 856(c)(3)
249
I.R.C. § 856(c)(4)
250
I.R.C. § 857(a)
251
Kanda & Levmore, supra note 25, at 246 (“The requirement of immediate
distribution of income works to deny control over the timing of taxes”).
252
This requirement excludes net capital gains. I.R.C. § 857(a).
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do not qualify for long-term capital gains rates.253 This means that most REIT
dividends are taxed at the shareholder’s marginal tax rate. As explained
above,254 the investor-level tax rate (before the TCJA) could be as high as
43.4%. The exception to this rule are REIT dividends that are attributable to
capital gains from the disposition of real-estate assets by the REIT.255 These
“capital gains dividends” do qualify for the lower 23.8% tax rate.256
On its face, the shareholder-level price seem to be worth the trouble.
Under the classical double-tax model (applying pre-TCJA rates), the
combined effective rate of 35% corporate level tax, plus 23.8% tax on
dividends is 50.47%.257 This is higher is higher than the maximum possible
effective shareholder-level rate of 43.4%.
The idea of a REIT spinoff transaction is to enable a corporation whose
primary activity is not in real estate investment, to take advantage of the REIT
regime. A stylized example can help to illustrate such scheme.
Assume RetailCo is a corporation that owns and operates large retail
stores. RetailCo cannot qualify as a REIT, because its primary business is in
retail, not in real estate investment. Nonetheless, the stores themselves are
real estate assets, and represent a significant portion of RetailCo’s assets.
ReatilCo can take advantage of the REIT regime by spinning off its retail
stores into a REIT as follows:
First, RetaiCo creates a new corporation, REITCO. RetailCo then
contributes all of its stores to REITCO. Second, RetailCo distributes (spins
off) REITCO to its shareholders. From a shareholder point of view, nothing
of economic significance has changed. The only change is a legal change:
instead of owning stock in one corporation, shareholders’ interests are now
divided between two entities. One that owns the stores (REITCO), and
another that operates the stores (RetailCo). Before a 2015 change in law, the
spinoff could be structured as a non-taxable transaction. 258
After the spinoff, REITCO leases the stores (i.e., the real estate assets) to
RetailCo, and RetailCo continue to operate them in its retail business. The
253

I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(1)(D), (h)(11). REIT managers may designate dividends attributable
to REIT-level capital gains, as “capital gains dividend” taxed at preferred rates. I.R.C. §
857(b)(3)(c).
254
See, supra notes 198-199 and accompanying discussion.
255
In REIT spinoffs, however, very little REIT income is expected to be capital gains
income. The reason is that the REIT is not organized with the primary purpose of acquiring
and disposing of real estate (which would generate capital gains), but rather to service the
operation of the original corporation. Most of the REIT income will be from the lease
payments, which are classified as ordinary income (rather than capital gain).
256
Supra note 253.
257
If corporate income is taxed at 35%, this leaves 65% of the income to distribute. If
all income is distributed and taxed at 23.8%, the shareholder is left with 0.65x(1-0.238), or
49.53% of the income, for an effective tax rate of 50.47%.
258
Supra note 243.
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lease payments are deductible to the RetailCo, and eliminate much of the
RetailCo’s tax base. The income from the leasing payments shows up on
REITCO’s books. Ordinarily, such payment would be taxable to REITCO.
However, REITCO can now elect to be a REIT. The reason is that all of
REITCO’s assets are qualifying real estate assets (the stores), and all of
REITCO’s income is qualifying real estate income (lease payments).
As a REIT, REITCO now must distribute all of its income from the lease
payments to shareholders. While this distribution is deductible to REITCO
(thus eliminating corporate-level income), the dividend receipts are
includible to shareholders. The result is that nothing of substance had
changed. The only income producing activity is still the retail income. The
shareholders are the same shareholders. The only difference is that by the
magic of paperwork RetailCo became two corporations. RetailCo can now
make a deductible payment to REITCO, but REITCO is not required pay tax
on such receipt as long as it distributes its profits to shareholders.
ii. REIT Spinoffs as STCTs
Consider, for example a taxable shareholder in a publicly traded
corporation. If the corporation earns $100, the corporation will be subject to
a pre-TCJA tax of 35%, leaving $65 for distribution. If such amount is
distributed, the shareholders will be subject to additional tax of 23.8%,
leaving the shareholder with net income of $49.53. The combined double-tax
burden is 50.57%. If, on the other hand, the corporation turns into a REIT and
earns $100, and the entire amount is distributed, there is no corporate-level
tax. The shareholder, however, may be subject to tax as high as 43.4% on
such distribution. This is better, so it seems, than 50.57%.
This assumes, however, that in the comparable non-REIT structures, the
corporation distributes all its available earnings. There is no reason to assume
that this is the case.259 Consider, for example, a situation in which only half
of the corporate $100 profit is distributed.260 At 35% corporate tax rate, the
corporation will be subject to $35 of tax. This would leave $65 to be
distributed. If only half is distributed (meaning, $32.5) the shareholder-level
tax liability is $7.735 (23.8% times $32.5). The total current tax liability is
therefore $35 + $7.735 = $42.735, which is lower than the current tax liability
under the REIT alternative. This is, again, a counter-intuitive result, because
REIT conversions are perceived to be beneficial to shareholders from a tax
259

See, Borden, supra note 20 at 542 (“[C]orporations are not subject to a distribution
requirement. Corporations can therefore avoid subjecting their income to double tax by
reinvesting the income and not making distributions”).
260
This is a conservative assumption, because corporations typically distribute less than
half of their income. Id. (“In fact, in practice corporations distribute no more than 25 percent
of their taxable income on average”).
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point of view.
Table 5 below summarizes this outcome:
Table 5

Gross corporate income
Corporate-level tax (35%)
Profits available for
distribution
Profits distributed
Shareholder-level tax
Total tax burden

Regular Corporation
(distributes 50% of available
profits)
$100
($35)
$65
$32.5
23.8% x $32.5 = ($7.735)
$32.5 + $7.735 =
($42.735)

REIT (must distribute all
available profits)
$100
$0
(all profits distributed
and deducted)
$100
$100
43.4% x $100 = ($43.4)
($43.3)

There is another important point to consider in the context of REIT
spinoffs and conversions. In a regular corporation, shareholders can control
the timing of recognition of the second level of tax. Assume for example, that
the corporation (before turning into a REIT), did not regulatory distribute it
earnings. While the 35% corporate-level tax is imposed when the corporation
earns the income, the shareholder level tax (23.8%) is only due when the
shareholder decides to sell the stock. The shareholder is able to defer the tax
liability, and at least in theory, reduce the net present value of the tax
burden.261 Consider for example, a shareholder with a basis of $25 that plans
to defer the sale of a stock worth $65 for four years, and that the market
discount rate is five percent. The net present value of the future tax is about
$7.83 [(23.8% x (65-25) / (1+0.05)^4]. Combined with the $35 corporatelevel tax (due today), the NPV of the total tax burden is $42.83. This is less
than the $43.4 due today under the REIT scenario.
Finally, recall that one of the potential benefits of corporate taxation—
per Kanda and Levmore—is to alleviate conflicts of interest among
shareholders regarding in-corporate dispositions. Under their theory, when
entity-level actions generate shareholder-level tax liabilities, managers (who
are also shareholders) may prefer their own tax interest and, for example,
delay corporate dispositions in order to delay shareholder-level taxes. This
problem is re-introduced in the REIT contexts. Since REIT must distribute
most of its profits managers may engage in corporate-level profit
management in order to delay or advance profits recognition, thus timing the
required distributions to benefit management’s tax interests.
261

“In theory”, since corporate earnings may also increase, and such increasing earnings
are subject to tax and increase future distributions. Does it is not necessarily that deferral
reduces the NPV of the tax liability.
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THE IMPLICATIONS OF STCTS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT THEM

Thus far, I outlined a counter-intuitive descriptive claim: Management
actions that reduce corporate tax liability may increase the overall tax burden
on some shareholders. Such outcome is possible because managers and taxexempt shareholders rationally cooperate against the interest of taxable
shareholders. The purposes in this part is to explain why it matters (Subpart
A), and to offer potential solutions to the problem (Subpart B).
a. The Legal and Normative Implications of STCTs
i. Shareholder Primacy and Managers’ Duty to Reduce
Corporate Taxes
Some commentators argue that managers have a fiduciary duty to
shareholders to reduce corporate tax liability.262 As a matter of positive law,
this argument is questionable. No law that I am aware of requires managers
to engage in corporate tax planning, and no court that I am aware of has
interpreted the law to find such a duty.263
However, it is worth considering the rational of such arguments in the
context of STCTs. The suggestion that management has a fiduciary duty to
increase shareholders wealth by reducing corporate taxes makes an explicit
normative choice, adopting the shareholder primacy view of the corporation.
Under this view, normative assessment of corporate laws (and management
actions) is based on whether they enhance shareholder value.264 “Shareholder
primacy is said to offer management a way to evaluate decisions within the
framework of a single-valued objective function”,265 that is, shareholder
welfare. The shareholder primacy view is a prevalent view in academic
discourse.266
262

See, supra note 6.
See, supra note 7. Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah explored this question at length from
both practical and theoretical point of view, considering the duty of managers to reduce
corporate taxes under different corporate theories. See, Avi-Yonah, Corporate Social
Responsibility, supra note 5. He concludes that “under any of the major views of
corporations, corporations should not be permitted to engage in strategic behavior designed
solely to minimize its taxes.” Id., at 28.
264
Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy,
31 J. Corp. L. 637, 637-8 (2006) (describing shareholder primacy as a normative linchpin to
assess corporate law); Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize
Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2017 J. of L. Fin. & Account. 247 (2017) (Argue
that companies should operate to increase shareholders welfare).
265
Fisch, id., at 661
266
LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 33 (2012) “[M]any legal
263
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However, the shareholder primacy approach has been criticized, among
others, because it contains an implicit assumption that common shareholders
share homogenous interests.267 In reality, shareholders have diverse
investment tastes, which translate to different preferences for corporate
behavior. “Recognizing these differences reveals that the idea of a single
objectively measurable “shareholder value” is not only quixotic, but
intellectually incoherent.”268
STCTs offer a practical example supporting the critical view of the
shareholder primacy approach. The argument that managers engage in
corporate level tax planning to benefit shareholders implicitly assumes that
shareholders tax interests are homogenous. As I have shown, this assumption
cannot be reconciled with how tax law operates in practice. STCTs may
increase value to some shareholders but reduce it to others. This fact exposes
the logical incoherence of the argument that managers must engage in
corporate tax planning. If a corporate tax-reducing scheme may result in
increased tax-burden on shareholders, how can one argue that managers have
a duty to engage in such behavior under a shareholder value-maximization
theory?
Even if one adopts the view that managers must attempt to maximize
shareholders’ value, there is a real practical difficulty with articulating
managers’ duties in the context of STCTs. Managers do not know (and cannot
know) what are the personal tax consequences to each shareholder stemming
from a particular transaction. Managers simply do not have access to
shareholders’ personal tax information.269 As a result, managers can never
tell upfront whether an STCT is expected to increase or decrease shareholder
value in the aggregate.
To see why this observation is important, it is helpful to unpack some of
scholars today passionately embrace shareholder value as a normative goal… The perceived
superiority of the shareholder-oriented model has inspired a generation of would-be
reformers to work tirelessly to ‘improve’ corporate governance so managers focus on
shareholder value”).
267
Fisch, supra note 264, at 661. (“To the extent that the interests of different
stakeholders conflict, the stakeholder model offers no principled basis for choosing among
them. … Within the shareholder class, the investors vary considerably among such
dimensions as the time frame over which they invest, the extent to which they trade versus
passively holding the corporation’s stock, their degree of diversification, the extent to which
they hold nonequity interests in the issuer, any option or other hedging positions that they
hold, and so forth”); STOUT, id., at 60 (“The standard shareholder-oriented model assumes a
hypothetical, homogeneous, abstract shareholder who does not and cannot exist).”
268
Stout, id., at 61.
269
Marian, Reconciling Tax Law and Securities Regulations, supra note 17, at 42-3
(“From a legal standpoint, privacy safeguards protect most taxpayer information, which
makes it impossible to acquire such information without a waiver from investors”).
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the components of managers’ fiduciary duties and explore them in the context
of STCTs. Managers’ fiduciary duties include, in broad terms, the duty of
loyalty (also known as the duty of fair dealing) and the duty of care.
Under the duty of loyalty, a manager “commits allegiance to the
enterprise and acknowledges that the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders must prevail over any individual interest of his own.”270
Corporate officers “can neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor
expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of selfdealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all
stockholders generally.”271
Due to shareholders’ tax heterogeneity, STCT benefits do not necessarily
flow to “all stockholders generally”. In some STCTs, the benefit may flow
only to tax-exempt shareholders and managers at the expense of taxable
shareholders. In such a case, it is not only that managers have no duty to
engage in tax planning, but taxable shareholders may reasonably argue that
by receiving a gross-up payment, managers engage is self-dealing. Courts
have indeed recognized the duty of managers and majority shareholders to
“deal fairly with their corporation and minority shareholders.”272 If managers
would not have approved the transaction without the tax gross up, it could
suggest that managers preferred their own interests to the interest of taxable
shareholders and the corporation. Whether this is the case, is a transactionspecific question, and requires a fact-intensive inquiry.
The other major component of managers’ fiduciary duties is the duty of
care. The duty of care is the duty “to perform the director's or officer's
functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be
in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily
prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise …”.273
While STCTs may reduce corporate-level taxes, it is difficult to argue that
the duty of care imposes an affirmative requirement that managers engage in
corporate tax planning. Rather, most corporate-level tax plans likely fall
under the “business judgment rule”. Under the business judgment rule,
managers would not breach their duty of care, as long as the managers make
a business judgment in good faith, are not self-interested in the transaction,
make the decision on an informed basis, and rationally believe that the
270
RESTATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE §4 Intro. Note (Am. Law Inst.
1994) (hereinafter: RESTATEMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE).
271
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).
272
RESTATEMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 270, at §5.01, and cases
cited therein.
273
Id., at §4.01.
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judgment is in the best interest of the corporation.274 The business judgment
rule “sharply reduces [managers] exposure to liability.”275 Courts are
reluctant to intervene in management business decisions, and generally
presume that management’s action is proper.276 Under such circumstances, it
is difficult to imagine that the duty of care includes a duty to engage (or not
to engage) in corporate tax planning, especially given that tax outcomes are
rarely certain.277
ii. STCTs are Inefficient
I explained throughout this article why STCTs might be inefficient.
STCTs are rarely Pareto-optimal and can be inefficient overall.
STCTs expose a gap in current U.S. securities laws. The underlying
assumption in U.S. securities laws is that as long as information is available,
shareholders will vote against inefficient corporate transactions. Efficient
capital market theory, however, does not take into account shareholders
heterogeneity in tax preferences, nor does it take into account the existence
of the unique ownership structures in U.S. equity markets.
Tax-exempt shareholders always stand to benefit from an STCT. They
will rationally vote for the transaction. If tax-exempts hold the majority
vote—as is usually the case in U.S. equity markets—every STCT will receive
shareholders’ approval, even if it is inefficient and even if all information
about the transaction is freely available in the market.
iii. STCTs Undo Distributional Policies
STCTs may have a negative effect on government distributional policies.
The crux of the argument here is that STCTs effectively shift tax burden from
one group of taxpayers to another, through private action.
Taxpayers may agree to shift the tax burden among themselves through
contractual relationships. For example, sellers in private transactions may
increase the price to account for the expected tax cost of the transaction.278 It
274

Id.
Id.
276
Id. (“Courts, when applying the business judgment rule, have often stated that a
“presumption” exists in favor of the propriety or regularity of the actions of directors and
officers. This correctly signifies that no inference of dereliction of duty can or should be
drawn, for example, from the fact that a corporation has suffered a business reversal.”);
Kamin v. American Exp. Co., 86 Misc.2d 809, 914 (1976) (Finding no actionable claim when
managers were aware that certain transaction structure would “result in the realization of a
substantial income tax saving”, but chose a different structure due to “countervailing
considerations”).
277
See, e.g., Seinfeld v. Slager, supra note 7.
278
For example, credit agreement include a standard provision under which borrowers agree
275
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is difficult to argue against such arrangements if they are a result of a
negotiation between willing parties, who agree to alter the legally prescribed
tax burdens. STCTs, however, shift the corporate tax burden from the
corporation and its managers to taxable shareholders. This shift can happen
against the will of taxable shareholders, who have no legal recourse to
prevent the transaction.
Under such circumstances—where tax reduction is achieved through
shifting of the burden to an unwilling party—distributional considerations are
paramount. Assuming government policy aims to achieve certain
distributional effects through the tax system, STCTs frustrate such policy.
b. Paths to Address the Agency Problems of STCTs
In this subpart I offer three potential courses of action to address STCTs
agency problems: Market based solutions, tax-law based solutions, and
corporate-law based solutions.
i. Market based solutions
If left to its own device, capital markets will never correct the agency
problems associated with STCTs. As explained above, assuming rational
behavior of market participants, and majority ownership of tax-exempt
shareholders, shareholders will always approve STCTs.
It has been suggested that “a gross-up could discourage the relevant
practice by calling more attention to it.”279 This is unlikely to be a real
deterrent. The corporate tax savings accruing to tax exempt shareholders will
almost always outweigh the cost of the gross-up. Thus, rational decision
making would dictate that tax-exempt shareholders vote for the gross-up. It
is only possible to imagine a market-based solution under a capital market
structure that is different from the one we currently have, where tax-exempt
shareholders do not hold the majority vote.
Another possible argument for market-based approach is to rely on
clientele effects. Namely, the idea that investors can choose to invest in
companies that match the investors’ tax preferences. Under this scenario,
rational taxable shareholders should avoid investing in firms that engage in
STCTs. As explained above,280 clientele theory is probably unhelpful in the
context of STCTs. Unlike in the case of known corporate distribution policies
to increase interest payment in order to gross up lenders for any withholding tax imposed on
interest payments. See, MICHAEL BELLUCCI & JEROME MCCLUSKEY, THE LSTA'S
COMPLETE CREDIT AGREEMENT GUIDE 122-125 (2nd ed., 2017) (Describing standard tax
gross-op provisions in credit agreements).
279
Schizer, supra note 3, at ¶2.7.
280
Supra note 133 and accompanying discussion.
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(which investors can rely on when making investment decisions), investors
learn of an STCT only after the fact. At that point, taxable shareholders have
already internalized any tax cost associated with the transaction, and have no
recourse (other than to sue the corporation).
ii. Tax-Law based solutions
Tax law solutions can come in two forms. One, by addressing the
underlying problem—the double-tax model—and adopt some form of
corporate tax overhaul that would solve the problem. Second, by adopting a
tailored solution aimed at undoing the agency problem. Both of these tax law
avenues are not particularly promising.
Corporate tax overhaul. One overhaul of the corporate tax system worth
considering is integration. The first obvious problem with such a solution is
that it does not seem politically attainable, given the heterogeneity of interests
involved. Even if we can achieve integration, however, integration will not
necessarily solve the agency problem identified, and may create new agency
problems. Moreover, the huge costs of integration weigh against adopting it
as a solution to a corporate-governance problem.
Consider full imputation, for example. Under a full imputation system,
corporate-level taxes serve as an “advance” on shareholder-level payment. In
such a case, all shareholders would benefit from corporate tax reduction.
However, other agency costs may present themselves.
For example, managers would still have interest in lowering the
corporate-level tax liability, to the extent management’s compensation is
connected to after-tax outcomes. This means that managers have an incentive
to push the bulk of the taxes to the shareholder level, for example, by delaying
the timing of dispositions of in-corporate assets in a manner that lowers
corporate tax. If managers are also shareholders, they may have an incentive
to time corporate dispositions in a way that benefits their personal tax status
(for example, cause the corporation to incur high tax liability in a year
managers know they will have personal tax attributes to offset such liability).
This is the tax timing problem discussed by Kanda and Levmore.281
Integration in the form of dividend-deduction will amplify the agency
problems associated with distribution policies.282 Managers will have an
incentive to distribute earnings at times when distribution is the most
beneficial to the corporation’s tax liability, for example, when the corporation
has taxable income to offset. Thus, managers may have an incentive to
distribute earnings for the benefit of the deduction, rather than reinvest the
281
282

Supra note 109.
See, discussion supra at Part II.c.
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corporate earning in new capital.
A dividend-exemption system would presumably put all shareholders on
equal footing (none pays shareholder-level tax and all enjoy corporate level
tax reduction). However, tax-exempt shareholders are likely to object to such
a system, because it denies them of the inherent advantage they have in
current markets. Congress chose to grant tax-exempt status to specific
institutions that advance certain public policy issues. A dividend-exemption
system will undo much of the policies underlying tax exemption.
In summary, different actors have different preferences for different
integration systems.283 Adopting integration is not a panacea to agency costs
associated with the heterogeneous tax preferences of shareholders. In
addition, any integration system carries with it multiple additional costs and
benefits. For example, moving from a double tax to a single tax model is
likely to cause a major revenue loss. On the other hand, it may have macroeconomic benefits such as increased investment.284 These macro-economic
effects seem to be much more important than any agency problems associated
with STCTs. If Congress adopts integration, it should be because tax writers
believe it is good corporate tax policy, and not because it is a solution to the
agency problems associate with STCTs.
Another type corporate tax overhaul that can mitigate the STCT problem
is to require shareholders to mark-to-market (MTM) their equity holdings.
Under an MTM regime “financial products… would be valued periodically,
and the holder would be taxable on the change in value over the period”.285
This means that shareholders basis of the end of each year would be adjusted
to account for taxable gains or losses. For example, if a stock in which a
shareholder had a basis of ten dollars appreciated by the end of the year to
twelve dollars, the shareholder will be required to pay tax on the two-dollar
difference, and the basis in the stock will increase to twelve dollars.
These MTM basis adjustments mean that in an STCTs, shareholders will
be subject to tax—at most—on changes in stock value that happened since
the beginning of the taxable year. In such a case, it is unlikely that
shareholders would suffer a major shareholder-level tax detriment, since the
taxable gain is limited. This is unlike the case of shareholders who, under
current law, may hold corporate stock for long periods, in which the stock
283
Doran, supra note 89.
Scott Greenberg, Corporate Integration: An Important Component of Tax Reform, TAX
FOUND. FISCAL NO. 506, 12 (Apr. 21, 2016) (“Corporate integration would lower the
combined tax burden on corporate income, which would increase investment and economic
growth in the United States”).
285
Redd Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 71
TEX. L. REV. 243, 247 (1992).
284
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accumulate significant appreciation while shareholder basis remains low. An
MTM regime would make the shareholder-level tax costs associated with
STCTs minuscule.
There are two problems, however, that make MTM an unsuitable
solution. First, a MTM regime seem to be politically unattainable. MTM has
been discussed for decades in the United States, and received widespread
academic support.286Political resistance, however, stopped all attempts at
MTM reforms in their tracks. Second, like integration, MTM would
constitute a major overhaul of the system by which we tax corporations. It
seems extreme to adopt such a system just to solve the governance issues of
STCTs. It will be a nice derivative benefit of such system, though, if it is ever
adopted.
If integration and MTM seems like an overkill, it is worth considering
narrowly tailored tax solutions. Unfortunately, tailored tax solutions for
corporate governance problems have been tried in the past, and spectacularly
failed. The reason is that insiders are simply able to contract around any such
tax provision. An obvious example is gross-up payments in inversions, which
bypass the excise tax of Section 4985. Section 4985 is a governance-driven
provision, the purpose of which is to have managers internalize the
shareholder-level tax costs of inversions. Managers and tax-exempt investors
simply contract around this provision by allowing the corporation to grossup the tax cost to managers.
Other governance-related tax provision that dot the IRC have failed in
similar tasks.287 For example, Section 162(m) supposedly creates a tax
disincentive for excessive executive compensation. It does so by denying a
corporation a deduction for executive compensation in excess of one million
dollars.288 However, Section 162(m) main effect has been to change the form
(rather than the amount) of management compensation, from cash, to
incentive pay in stock options and other derivatives that are exempt from the
limitation.289 This created much more opaque compensation schemes, which
286

Mark Gergen, How to Tax Capital, 70 Tax L. Rev. 1, fn3 (2016) (“There are many
proposals to replace the corporate income tax with an income tax assessed on the changes in
the market value of corporate securities”, and source cited therein).
287
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(m) (denying deductions for excessive executive
compensation); I.R.C. § 280G (denying deductions for certain golden parachute payments);
I.R.C. §;4999 (imposing excise tax on certain golden parachute payments); I.R.C. § 5881
(imposing excise tax on greenmail payments); None of these provisions meaningfully
remedied the corporate governance issue they were addressing.
288
I.R.C. § 162(m).
289
Schizer, supra note 3, at ¶3.1.3 (“Section 162(m) is not an encouraging precedent.
When enacted in 1993, it was explained as a limit on the amount of pay. Nevertheless, its
main effect has been on the type of pay, since it offers a widely used exception for
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are harder for shareholders to monitor. It has even been suggested that section
162(m) carries a partial blame for the options backdating scandals of the early
2000s.290
To summarize, any specifically tailored tax disincentive is unlikely to
prevent unwanted managerial behavior. It is more likely to increase the cost
of unwanted behavior by incentivizing expensive contractual workarounds.
iii. Corporate Law Solutions
Corporate-law based solutions to the agency problems of STCTs can
come in several forms: empowering the minority (taxable) shareholders in
STCT voting, compensating minority shareholders for their tax costs, or
forcing managers to internalize personal costs associated with STCTs.
Empowering taxable shareholders. Since only taxable shareholders are
likely to suffer a net detriment in an STCT, a possible course of action would
be to require that—in addition to regular shareholder majority—a majority of
taxable shareholders approve the transaction. Assuming taxable shareholders
behave rationally, they will only approve transactions in which the net
corporate tax benefits flowing to them exceed the shareholder-level tax cost.
While such requirement offers an elegant theoretical solution, is suffers
from several real-world problems. First, it would be a mistake to treat to all
taxable shareholders as a single class of shareholders for tax purposes.
Taxable shareholders individualized tax-positions vary significantly based
on, among others, each shareholder’s personal tax attributes, tax rates, and
holding period in the stock.291 It is possible that a majority of taxable
shareholders would vote for an STCT, when some taxable shareholders still
suffer a detriment. Nonetheless, because fewer shareholders suffer a
detriment, the inefficiency cost is likely much smaller in such a case
compared with current situation. Requiring a majority vote of taxable
shareholders is an imperfect proxy to shareholders’ tax preferences, yet one
that offers an improvement.
A second problem of requiring a majority of taxable shareholders to vote
for an STCT may be the holdout problem. For example, in corporations with
very few taxable shareholders, a small minority of shareholders may find
‘performance-based compensation’); See, also, JCT ENRON REPORT, supra note 137, at 43
(“The $1 million deduction limitation was designed to address corporate governance
concerns that top executives were receiving excessive compensation. The experience with
Enron indicates that the limitation is not effective in achieving its purposes”).
290
Schitzer, id. (“Section 162(m) may even have motivated some firms to commit fraud.
By favoring options that were at-the-money when granted, the rule creates a tax incentive to
lie about the grant date”); For a description of the options backdating scandal, see, Jesse M.
Fried, Option Backdating and its Implications, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853 (2008)
291
See, supra notes 17-18 and accompanying discussion.
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itself in a position to prevent an otherwise efficient transaction, using such
position to extract a payout from the corporation. Whether such problem is
significant is an empirical question. It depends on the size of the taxable
shareholders’ holding. However, a payout to taxable holdouts is functionally
no different from tax gross-up payments to managers. As long as the grossup payment is less than the corporate tax savings, the transaction is still
efficient, and shareholders will approve it. If holdout shareholders operate
rationally, it will make no sense for them to require a payout that is in excess
of the corporate tax savings, because in such a case they are likely to incur a
loss themselves.
On balance, I believe that a solution empowering taxable shareholders in
the context of STCTs is worthy of serious consideration.
Compensating taxable shareholders for shareholder-level taxes. A
different way to assure STCTs are efficient is by requiring the corporation to
compensate taxable shareholders for their tax cost, the same way that grossup payment compensate managers. This “global tax gross-up” will burden
the corporation with significant additional cost. However, as long as the
corporate tax saving outweighs the cost of the global gross-up, rational
shareholders will approve the transaction. The elegance of this theoretical
solution is that it forces tax-exempt shareholders to internalize the cost to
taxable shareholders, instead of shifting the cost to taxable shareholders.
Again, there are several real-world problems with this solution. First, it
may not be the least-wasteful solution. Under the previous solution discussed
(requiring a majority of taxable shareholders to approve the transaction), only
some taxable shareholders may demand compensation. Under a global grossup, a payoff is required to all taxable shareholders. This seems like an
excessive, largely avoidable cost. It is better to pay a few taxable shareholders
rather than all taxable shareholders.
Another problem with the global gross-up idea is that it is impossible for
the corporation to assess the cost of the global gross-up. The corporation does
not have private taxpayer-information on shareholders necessary to calculate
the expected tax cost for each shareholder.292 Nonetheless, a solution would
be to use (again) and imperfect proxy to calculate such cost. For example,
one could assume that the tax cost for which managers are being grossed-up,
is incurred by each of the other taxable shareholder. It is possible to calculate
a proportion of gross-up amount per share (or other equity rights) held by
managers, and pay each taxable shareholder based on such ratio.
Forcing managers to internalize costs. Finally, it is possible to think of a
regulatory solution that forces managers to internalize their personal tax cost.
For example, we could have an outright legal prohibition on tax gross-up
292
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payments.
This solution is unlikely to be successful, mainly because it is impossible
to enforce. A ban of gross-up payments is likely to result in contractual workaround that result in other inefficiencies. For example, managers will demand
increased compensation, or compensation in formats that are not subject to
taxation in STCTs. Not only the problem remains, but it is also likely that the
opacity of managers’ compensation structure will increase.
To summarize, market-based and tax-based solutions to the agency
problems of STCTs do not hold much promise. Of the corporate-law-based
solutions I discussed above, it seems that the best course of action is to
empower taxable shareholders. This can be achieved, for example, by
requiring that a majority of taxable shareholders vote to approve an STCT.
CONCLUSION
I questioned whether legal and successful corporate tax reduction
schemes are always beneficial to shareholders. I find the answer is in the
negative.
I identified a category of common corporate transactions, the generic
characteristic of which is that they directly affect shareholder-level taxes. In
such “shareholder taxable corporate transactions” (STCT), any corporate
level tax savings must be weighed against the shareholder-level tax cost.
Since shareholders have heterogeneous tax positions, some shareholders
may lose value in STCTs, while others gain value. STSCs are therefore rarely
Pareto-optimal at the shareholder level. It is also reasonable to assume that
some STCTs are Kaldor-Hicks inefficient. This would be the case where the
loosing shareholders lose more value in an STCT, that the gain accruing to
shareholders who are benefiting from the STCT.
I also explained why the unique ownership structure in U.S. equity
markets cause shareholders to approve inefficient STCTs, even when
information is freely available in the market. Tax-exempt investors hold the
majority vote in many corporations traded on U.S. equity markets. Such
investors have no shareholder-level tax to consider. They will always vote for
a corporate tax-saving transaction, even if it is detrimental to other (taxable)
shareholders.
Corporate managers, who hold taxable equity in the corporation or are
otherwise subject to personal tax because of an STCT, may not favor STCTs.
However, if the managers’ personal tax cost is less than the corporate-level
tax savings, managers and tax-exempt investor would rationally agree to have
the corporation indemnify managers for their personal tax cost. This will
defuse management’s disincentive in the transaction, while imposing an
additional cost on taxable shareholders, in the form of and additional financial
burden on the corporation.
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The problems described above are likely to get worse under the recently
enacted tax reform. The reason is that recent reform significantly reduced
corporate tax rates, while leaving shareholder-level tax rates largely
unchanged. This means that any corporate tax saving is likely to be less
beneficial (it saves less taxes), while shareholders taxes remain just as
detrimental.
I explored several potential solutions to the problem and concluded that
the best (even if not perfect) solution is to empower taxable shareholders in
the context of STCTs.
APPENDIX
It is helpful to generalize the arguments presented in Section II by
presenting simple a formal model. The model demonstrates the conditions
under which STCTs hurt taxable shareholders (meaning, are not Paetrooptimal), or are Kaldor-Hicks inefficient.
Assume, as in the stylized examples in Section II, that in the absence of
an STCT, taxable shareholders pay no shareholder-level tax. In the presence
of an STCT, taxable shareholders are subject to shareholder-level taxes both
on the marginal earnings resulting from the STCT, as well as the built-in
appreciation in their equity prior to the STCT. I denote the relevant variables
as follows:
V – Corporate Value before an STCT.
Rc – Corporate Tax Rate.
I – Reduction in Taxable Income Due to an STCT.
ΔV – Corporate savings due to structuring (meaning, ΔV = I·Rc).
P = Proportional Interest of Taxable Shareholders.
Rp = Shareholders Personal Tax Rate.
B = Taxable Shareholders’ Basis in the Stock.
A. Pareto Inefficient STCTs
Taxable shareholders are worse off when increase in value of their
corporate holding flowing to them from corporate tax savings, is less than
increased tax owed due to the STCT. Formally:
PΔV < Rp(P(V + ΔV) – B) = RpPV + RpPΔV – RpB
PΔV – RpPΔV < RpPV – RpB
PΔV (1 - Rp) < Rp(PV – B)
We substitute ΔV:
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This makes vivid that, as the corporate rate decreases, the left side of the
equation decreases, meaning that all else equal, a decrease in corporate tax
rate will push toward taxable shareholders being worse off.
B. Kaldor-Hicks Inefficient STCTs
STCTs are Kaldor-Hicks inefficient when taxable shareholders tax cost
exceeds the total tax saved at the corporate level. Formally, when:
ΔV < Rp(P(V + ΔV) – B) = RpPV + RpPΔV – RpB
ΔV – RpPΔV < RpPV – RpB
ΔV (1 - RpP) < Rp(PV – B)
–

Then substituting for corporate value, we get:
(2)
–

C. Management Tax Gross-Up
Finally, it is also possible to derive the formula for the management grossup payment, under the assumption that a gross up makes management
indifferent to personal tax cost. Assume that:
M = Proportional Equity Interest of Management
G = Gross-Up Payment
S = Tax Savings to the Corporation.
V1 = Corporation’s gross value after the transaction.
To make this modeling a bit more realistic (and for the sake of simplicity),
we shall assume that management’s shareholder-level tax is in the form of an
excise tax, imposed on management equity value.
Managers are indifferent to shareholder-level tax if their pre-STCT value
is the same as their post-STCT gross value, reduced by their shareholderlevel taxes, increased by the gross up payment, and reduced again by the tax
on the gross-up payment. Formally, when:
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MV = MV1 – RpMV1 + G – RpG.
= MV1(1 - Rp) + G(1 - Rp)
= (1 - Rp)( MV1 + G)
Note, However, that in this case, the post-transaction value must account
for the fact the any tax benefit to the corporation, is reduced by the gross-up
payment. Namely:
V1 = V + S – G
We substitute:
MV = (1 - Rp)( MV + MS – MG + G)
MV = MV + MS – MG + G – RpMV – RpMS + RpMG – RpG
0 = M(S – RpV – RpS) + G(1 – M + RpM - Rp)
G

M R V R S
1– M
R M
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1 R 1
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